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OKLAHOMA
LAW REVIEW
VOLUME 40 WINTER 1987 NUMBER 4
THE END OF SCHOOL BUSING? SCHOOL
DESEGREGATION AND THE FINDING OF
UNITARY STATUS
THomAs E. CHANDIER*
During its 1986-87 term, the United States Supreme Court declined to review
two cases that addressed public school board efforts to end court-ordered
busing.' As a result, the Norfolk, Virginia, public school district became the
first school district in the country to end court-ordered busing.2 At the same
time, however, the Oklahoma City School Board's plan to curtail compulsory
busing was blocked. 3 These cases suggest that thirty-two years after Brown
v. Board of Education' and fifteen years after Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg
Board of Education,5 school desegregation and busing are not dead issues.
Moreover, these cases indicate that the issue of ending busing-not whether
to bus-may begin the next phase of litigation in the long history of school
desegregation cases.
The history of school desegregation is not entirely a happy one. For exam-
ple, the events that occurred in Little Rock, Arkansas, in 1957 represent only
o 1987 Thomas E. Chandler
* B.B.A., 1977, University of Michigan; J.D., 1981, LL.M., 1987, National Law Center,
George Washington University; Member, District of Columbia Bar.-Ed.
1. Dowell v. Board of Educ., 795 F.2d 1516 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 420 (1986);
Riddick v. School Bd., 784 F.2d 521 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 420 (1986). The Supreme
Court has not reviewed a busing case since 1979. See Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 443
U.S. 526 (1979) (Dayton II); Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449 (1979). See also
infra note 76.
2. Washington Post, Nov. 4, 1986, at Al, col. 4. The Fourth Circuit's decision in Riddick
upheld the Norfolk School Board's plan to end busing of elementary schoolchildren. This case
is discussed more fully below in the sections on the findings and effects of unitary status.
3. Dowell v. Board of Educ., 795 F.2d 1516 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 420 (1986).
4. 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (Brown 1). The Court in Brown I held that government-mandated
racial segregation in public schools violated the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment.
5. 402 U.S. 1 (1971). The Court in Swann approved the remedial use of court-ordered bus-
ing in school desegregation cases.
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one extreme of the early efforts made to defy the Brown I decision. 6 Yet,
despite these efforts, enormous progress has been made to eradicate publicly
sanctioned racial segregation in public education, 7 and the Brown I decision
has been properly recognized as "one of the most important events in the
recent history of the United States." 8 The resulting transformation in public
education is almost singularly a result of the persistence of the federal courts
in pursuing the promise of Brown P. Frequently, however, this persistence
has resulted in the federal courts,.and not the local school boards, running
the public schools.
The long-term involvement of the federal courts in school districts resulted
from the failure of the local school boards to fulfill their own "affirmative
obligation" to eliminate all vestiges of state-imposed segregation.'" The
Supreme Court declared in Brown l that "[s]chool authorities have the primary
responsibility" of ending state-sponsored segregation." However, Brown II
also instructed the lower federal courts to use their broad equitable powers
to eliminate obstacles to the transition mandated by Brown L12 As a result,
in many cases "the magnitude of the constitutional violation, the scope of
the remedy required to redress the violation, and the possibility of recurring
violations" has made it necessary for the district courts to retain active super-
vision over cases for considerable periods of time.I3 In fact, continuing federal
court supervision of school districts spanning twenty-five to thirty years is
not uncommon." For example, the Norfolk school desegregation case that
6. See Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958). The Cooper case involved actions by the Gover-
nor and legislature of Arkansas to prevent the implementation of the Brown I decision. The
Governor went so far as to use state troops to prevent blacks from entering a previously all-white
high school. These events resulted in a constitutional crisis that led the Supreme Court to con-
vene a rare special session. See also Aaron v. Cooper, 156 F. Supp. 220 (E.D. Ark. 1957), aff'd
sub nom. Faubus v. United States, 254 F.2d 797 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 829 (1958).
7. See, e.g., U.S. Comm'N ON CrviL RIGHTS, CLEAUNGHOUSE PUB. No. 76, STATEMENT OF
THE UNITED STATEs COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS ON SCHOOL DESEGREGATION 52 (1982).
8. R. WOLiERs, THE BUDEN OF BRowN-THm ar YEARS OF SCHOOL DESEGREGATION 3 (1984).
Brown I has also been recognized as giving the injunction a new prominence in remedial
jurisprudence, a. prominence that began with the school desegregation cases and was later ex-
tended to civil rights cases in general. 0. Fiss, Tim Cvm RIGHTS INJUNCTION 4 (1978). The in-
junction necessarily underlies all court-ordered busing. Further, although Brown I technically
applied only to public education, the case began a long series of decisions holding invalid state-
imposed racial tegregation in other public facilities. See, e.g., Turner v. City of Memphis, 369
U.S. 350 (1962) (per curiam) (airport restaurants); Gayle v. Browder, 352 U.S. 903 (1956) (per
curiam) (public buses).
9. See, e.g., supra note 7.
10. See Swan v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 15 (1971); Green v. County
School Bd,, 391 U.S. 430, 437-38 (1968).
11. Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 299 (1955) (Brown fl).
12. Id. at 300.
13. See Lee v. Macon County Bd. of Educ., 584 F.2d 78, 81 (5th Cir. 1978).
14. In the late 1950s and 1960s hundreds of lawsuits were filed seeking to enforce the man-
dates of the Brown decisions. The Riddick and Dowell cases are just two examples of such cases
that are still ongoing.
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spawned the Riddick decision began in 1956,15 and the Dowell case began
in 1961.16
At some point, however, federal court supervision of public school districts
does end. The threshold point is a finding that the "dual" school district
has been converted to a "unitary" system in which every facet of school opera-
tions has been desegregated.17 A finding of unitary status significantly affects
all parties to the litigation, including the role of the federal court in oversee-
ing the school district's compliance with Brown L Indeed, the Norfolk School
Board's successful plan to end busing was premised on a previous judicial
finding that the school system had achieved unitary status. 8 Thus, the issue
of when court-ordered busing may be terminated is really part of the broader
15. See supra note I and accompanying text. See also Beckett v. School Bd., 148 F. Supp.
430 (E.D. Va.), aff'd, 246 F.2d 325 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 855 (1957).
16. See supra note 1 and accompanying text. See also Dowell v. School Bd., 219 F. Supp.
427 (W.D. Okla. 1963).
17. Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 435-38 (1968). The Supreme Court in Green
first introduced the terminology of converting a dual system of education into a "unitary" system.
A unitary system generally implies that the school district has achieved full compliance with
the Court's decision in Brown I. Swam v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1,
31 (1971). See also Alexander v. Board of Educ., 396 U.S. 19, 20 (1969) (Court stated that
unitary school system is one "within which no person is to be effectively excluded from any
school because of race or color."). However, the terms "dual," "unitary," and "unitary status"
have not had universally accepted meanings. See generally Note, The Segregative Impact of Chang-
ing Demographics Upon School Districts Subject to Court-Ordered Desegregation, 49 GEo. WASH.
L. REv. 100, 105 n.46 (1980).
A "dual" school system can be broadly defined as any school system that is unlawfully
segregated, whether by state statute or as a result of policies adopted by school authorities. See
Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 201 (1973) (local school board policies); Green v.
County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 435 (1968) (statute). A dual school system is thus one where
de jure segregation exists. See infra note 66.
Confusion has also resulted from use of the terms "unitary" and "unitary status." Generally,
a unitary school system is one that has been desegregated. See, e.g., Smedley, Developments
in the Law of School Desegregation, 26 V.ND. L. REv. 405, 405-06 (1973). However, as the
Eleventh Circuit has recently noted, a "unitary" school system should be distinguished from
one that has achieved "unitary status." Georgia State Conf. of Branches of NAACP v. Georgia,
775 F.2d 1403, 1413 n.12 (11th Cir. 1985). The Eleventh Circuit defined a "unitary" school
system as "one which has not operated segregated schools as proscribed by cases such as Swann
and Green for a period of several years." Id. A school system that has achieved "unitary status,"
on the other hand, is "one which is not only unitary but has eliminated the vestiges of its prior
discrimination and has been adjudicated as such through proper judicial procedures." Id. As
discussed throughout this article, this distinction is 'central to defining the roles of the court
and the school board in dismantling dual school systems.
Some courts have adopted a specific definition of a unitary school system for the purposes
of a particular case. See, e.g., Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 653 F. Supp. 1536, 1541 (D. Colo. 1987).
This article adopts the Eleventh Circuit's terminology while recognizing that this terminology
has not been universally followed. See also Craven, Integrating the Desegregation Vocabulary-
Brown Rides North, Maybe, 73 W. VA. L. REv. 1 (1970-71).
18. Riddick v. School Bd., 784 F.2d 521, 543 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 420 (1986).
The finding of unitary status generally marks the time from which resegregation is constitu-
tionally permissible. These effects are addressed infra in "The Effect of a Finding of Unitary
Status."
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question of how a court's finding that a school system has achieved unitary
status affects a school desegregation case.
This article addresses how a finding of unitary status affects the school
board, the plaintiffs challenging the school board's actions, and the federal
court overseeing a school district's transition from a dual to a unitary system.
One of the critical issues addressed is whether plaintiffs challenging school
board actions taken subsequent to a finding of unitary status that adversely
affect minorities must prove discriminatory intent on the part of the school
board.' 9 Additionally, the Riddick and Dowell cases are examined with a view
toward reconciling the apparently contradictory decisions concerning a school
board's power to end busing subsequent to a finding that the school district
has achieved unitary status. These cases can be reconciled only by determin-
ing how a finding of unitary status affects previously issued mandatory in-
junctions. Finally, a procedure is suggested that would enable a court to ter-
minate its oversight of an offending public school system that has achieved
unitary status, while avoiding the apparent confusion of the Riddick and
Dowell cases.
Three preliminary matters are also addressed. First, the history of the
Supreme Court school desegregation cases is briefly traced. Second, the ef-
fect of the initial implementation of desegregation measures is discussed. Third,
the findings that a court must make and the procedures that it must follow
to declare a school system unitary are examined. Thus, the life-span of a typical
school desegregation case is put into both a historical context and the context
of the significant legal determinations that must be made to terminate the case.
The Supreme Court and School Desegregation: 1954-79
The history of the major school desegregation cases has been told frequently
and need not be retold in detail here."0 A brief review of the landmark cases
is necessary, however, to put into historical perspective the recent cases seek-
ing an end to busing and an end to federal court supervision of school districts
because these recent decisions draw heavily on earlier Supreme Court cases.
In fact, the legal issues being raised in these cases are the inevitable result
of earlier Supreme Court decisions. Moreover, recognizing why the federal
courts remain vigilant in ensuring that there is no retreat from the Brown
19. This question was one of the two Questions Presented in the Petition for Certiorari filed
in Dowell. The question as stated was: "Following a district court's finding that a dual sehbol
system has achieved 'unitary' status in a final order terminating jurisdiction, must a showing
of discriminator* intent be made by parties challenging [the] 'unitary' school system's new
neighborhood elementary school plan which curtails compulsory busing?" Petition for a Writ
of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit at (i), Board of Educ.
v. Dowell, 795 F.2d. 1516 (10th Cir.) (No. 86-326), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 420 (1986).
20. More recent treatment includes 2 R. ROTUNDA, J. NowAK & J. YoUNo, TREATISE oN
CoNsntuioN,%. LAW: SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE § 18.9 (1986); Devins, School Desegregation
Law in the 19'80s: The Courts' Abandonment of Brown v. Board of Education, 26 WM. &
MARY L. REv. 7, 13-25 (1984); Jones, The Desegregation of Urban Schools Thirty Years After
Brown, 55 U. CoLo. L. REv. 515 (1984).
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decisions requires some understanding of the long struggle 1 to end the per-
nicious system of racial segregation in public schools.
22
Twenty-eight years after the fourteenth amendment was ratified guarantee-
ing that no state shall deny to "any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws," '2 3 the Supreme Court held that states were free to
segregate persons on the basis of race so long as the separate facilities pro-
vided to each race were "equal." 2 ' As a result, many public institutions in
the North as well as the South "rushed headlong into the adoption of policies
and practices which put into place the principle of separate-but-equal."' ' The
public schools were no exception. 26 In the South state constitutions and statutes
rigidly mandated racial separation in public schools.2 ' In the North segregated
21. The struggle to end racial segregation in public schools often was widely and violently
opposed. See, e.g., supra note 6.
22. The Honorable Nathaniel R. Jones, now a Circuit Judge on the United States Court
of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, more eloquently expressed the similar point. He stated:
There is today a casualness, almost'a cynicism, associated with a reference to slavery.
This reaction feeds a national amnesia about the insidiousness of that institution
and the vestiges of it which are evident in a variety of contemporary institutions.
Consequently, the public has difficulty accepting, in this period of time, remedies
for racial wrongs.
Jones, supra note 20, at 516.
23. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
24. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896). The Court stated:
The object of the [fourteenth] amendment was undoubtedly to enforce the absolute
equality of the two races before the law, but, in the nature of things, it could
not have been intended to abolish distinctions based upon color, or to enforce social,
as distinguished from political, equality, or a commingling of the two races upon
terms unsatisfactory to either.
Id. at 544. The Court concluded that the Louisiana statute requiring railway companies to pro-
vide "equal but separate accommodations" for both black and white passengers was a reasonable
exercise of state police power. Id. Only one Justice-Justice Harlan-dissented.
25. Jones, supra note 20, at 518.
26. In some areas separate school facilities for blacks were already required by law. For ex-
ample, Congress passed a series of laws in the 1860s requiring separate schools for blacks in
the District of Columbia. See generally Carr v. Coming, 182 F.2d 14, 18 (D.C. Cir. 1950) (court
traces history of congressional legislation affecting the segregation of District of Columbia public
schools). See also Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 544-45 (1896) (Court notes the then common
establishment of separate schools for whites and blacks).
27. See, e.g., DEL. CONST. art X, § 2 (1897); DEL. REv. CODE § 2631 (1935) (repealed in
1968); KAN. GEN. STAT. § 72-1724 (1949) (permitting but not requiring separate school facilities)
(repealed 1957); S.C. CONST. art. XI, § 7 (1895); S.C. CODE § 5377 (1942) (current version at
S.C. CODE ANN. § 21-622 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1975)); TEx. CoNsT. art. VII, § 7 (1876); TEx.
REv. Cirv. STAT. ANN. arts. 2900, 2922-13, 2922-15 (1965) (repealed 1969); VA. CONST. art. IX,
§ 140 (1902); VA. CODE ANN. § 22-221 (1950) (repealed 1980). See generally Brown v. Board
of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 486-88 n.1 (1954) (Brown 1) (addressing the Kansas, South Carolina,
Virginia, and Delaware constitutional and statutory provisions); Ross v. Houston Indep. School
Dist., 699 F.2d 218, 220 n.3 (5th Cir. 1983) (discussing the Texas constitutional and statutory
provisions). Thirty-three years after the Supreme Court's decision in Brown I, expressly rejecting
government-mandated racial segregation in public schools, some state constitutions still retain
provisions prohibiting blacks and whites from attending the same schools. See, e.g., W. VA.
CONST. art. XII, §.
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schools resulted from official action taken with impunity in light of the Plessy
decision.
2 8
In 1954 the Supreme Court expressly rejected the separate-but-equal doc-
trine in public education and held that government-mandated racial segrega-
tion in public schools violated the equal protection clause. 21 The Court did
not, however, address the question of appropriate relief. The Court set the
question oF relief for reargument and invited the Attorney General of the
United States and other parties to submit new briefs. In 1955 the Court decided
Brown 113C and held that the school authorities must dismantle segregated
school systems "with all deliberate speed." 31 The Court stated that the school
authorities have the primary responsibility for complying with Brown I and
that the federal district courts, guided by equitable principles, should oversee
compliance.32 The Brown II decision was predicated on "faith in state and
lower federal courts, which, because of their proximity to local conditions,
were best suited to perform the duty of insuring good faith implementation
of the decision."" However, the school authorities and the lower courts were
given no specific guidelines for implementing the Court's edict.
Good faith did not follow. The Brown decisions were met with massive
resistance, including the events that occurred in Little Rock in 1957.11 These
events compelled the Supreme Court to expressly reaffirm the principles set
forth in Marbury v. Madison" and to state that its interpretation of the four-
teenth amendment in Brown I was binding on all states notwithstanding state
laws to the contrary."
State and local dilatory practices continued into the second decade after
28. See, e.g., Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189 (1973).
29. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (Brown 1) ("We conclude that in
the field of public education the doctrine of 'separate but equal' has no place."). For a brief
history of the cases attacking the separate-but-equal doctrine prior to Brown I, see Jones, supra
note 20, at 520-22.
30. Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955) (Brown I1).
31. Id. at 301.
32. Id. at 293-300.
33. R. RoTrUITDA, J. NowK & J. YoUNo, supra note 20, at 408. The Court was also sensitive
to the needs of the people to adjust to the changes Brown I required.
34. See supra note 6 and accompanying text. Other methods of defiance included state inter-
position resolutions (allowing the state, as a sovereign entity, to suspend the operation of federal
mandates within its borders), violence, harassment of civil rights workers, and oppressive regula-
tion of civil rights groups. The Court struck down one attempt to cripple civil rights groups
in NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958). These methods and others are surveyed in 2 N.
Doasiw, P. BniNnER, B. NEuBoRNE & S. LAW, PoiucAL AND Crvm R oHrs N Tim UNrrD STATnS
625-33 (4th ed. 1979).
35. 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803).
36. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958). The Court stated that Marbury "declared the
basic principle that the federal judiciary is supreme in the exposition of the law of the Constitu-
tion, and that principle has ever since been respected by this Court and the Country as a perma-
nent and indispensable feature of our constitutional system." Id. The Court added that "the
interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment enunciated by this Court in the Brown case is the
supreme law of the land, and Art. VI of the Constitution makes it of binding effect on the
States 'any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding'." Id.
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the Brown decisions, and with each passing year the Court's patience grew
thinner. In Griffin v. County School Board," the Court stated that "[t]he
time for mere 'deliberate speed' has run out.""31 Four years later, in Green
v. County School Board,39 the Court struck down a freedom-of-choice plan.
The Court in Green established the lasting principle that school boards
"operating state-compelled dual systems were ... clearly charged with the
affirmative duty to take whatever steps might be necessary to convert to a
unitary system in which racial discrimination would be eliminated root and
branch." ' Thus, the school board in Green was required not only to aban-
don its freedom-of-choice plan but to dismantle the dual system by coming
forward "with a plan that promises realistically to work, and promises
realistically to work now."'" In short, the Court declared that the test of any
remedy was its effectiveness. 2 The Court's discussion in Green of a school
board's duty to desegregate is among the Court's most quoted language in
school desegregation cases.
43
In 1969 the Supreme Court manifested its growing impatience with delay
by overturning its "all deliberate speed" timetable for desegregation. 44 The
Court stated that the "operation of segregated schools under a standard of
allowing 'all deliberate speed' for desegregation is no longer constitutionally
permissible." 41 The Court added that "[uinder explicit holdings of this Court
the obligation of every school district is to terminate dual school systems at
once and to operate now and hereafter only unitary schools." ' 46 The Court
also reaffirmed that the lower federal courts must retain jurisdiction over the
desegregation cases to "insure prompt and faithful compliance" with the
Court's orders.
47
37. 377 U.S. 218 (1964) (holding that closing public schools to avoid desegregation was a
denial of equal protection to black students).
38. Id. at 234. This case involved but one effort by the state of Virginia to circumvent the
Brown I decision, which struck down the Virginia segregation laws along with those in three
other states. See also infra text accompanying note 39.
39. 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
40. Id. at 437-38.
41. Id. at 439 (emphasis in original).
42. Jones, supra note 20, at 524.
43. The Green decision is important both for its mandate that school systems must achieve
"unitary" status, and for its discussion of the findings that must be made to achieve unitary
status. These findings are discussed infra in "The Finding of Unitary Status."
In a companion case to Green, the Court also emphasized that school boards have the respon-
sibility to promptly convert the school system to a unitary, nonracial system. Raney v. Board
of Educ., 391 U.S. 443, 447 (1968).
44. Alexander v. Board of Educ., 396 U.S. 19, 20 (1969) (per curiam).
45. Id.
46. Id. (citing Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 438-39, 442 (1968); Griffin v.
County School Bd., 377 U.S. 218, 234 (1964)).
47. Id. at 21. See also Raney v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 443, 449 (1968). In Raney the
Court stated that the district courts "should retain jurisdiction in school segregation cases to
insure (1) that a constitutionally acceptable plan is adopted, and (2) that it is operated in a con-
stitutionally permissible fashion so that the goal of a desegregated, non-racially operated school
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1987
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The next major school desegregation opinion was Swann v. Charlotte-
Mecklenburg Board of Education.48 In Swann the Court gave more precise
guidelines for school boards and district courts to follow in desegregating dual
school system.. 49 The Court stated that "[t]he district judge or school
authorities should make every effort to achieve the greatest possible degree
of actual desegregation." s The Court approved the use of racial quotas and
mandatory student assignment plans as starting points in shaping a remedy."'
The Court stated that:
Absent a constitutional violation there would be no basis for
judicially ordering assignments of students on a racial basis. All
things being equal, with no history of discrimination, it might well
be desirable to assign pupils to schools nearest their homes. But
all things are not equal in a system that has been deliberately con-
structed and maintained to enforce racial segregation. The remedy
for such segregation may be administratively awkward, inconven-
ient, and even bizarre in some situations and may impose burdens
on some; but all awkwardness and inconvenience cannot be avoided
in the interim period when remedial adjustments are being made
to eliminate the dual school systems. 2
The Court in Swann next addressed the issue of busing. The lower court
had found that the assignment of schoolchildren to the school nearest their
home would not produce an effective dismantling of the dual system." In
these circumstances the Court could "find no basis for holding that the local
school authorities may not be required to employ bus transportation as one
tool of school desegregation. ' 54 The Court added that "[d]esegregation plans
cannot be limited to the walk-in school." 55 With little further discussion, the
Court thus created one of the major social controversies of the 1970s-the
busing of schoolchildren to achieve racial desegregation. More important, the
Court refused to retreat from its basic holding in Brown L11
The Court concluded its decision in Swann with language that proved to
system is rapidly and finally achieved." Id. at 489 (quoting Kelly v. Altheimer, 378 F.2d 483,
389 (8th Cir. 1967)).
48. 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
49. Id. at 14. As a preliminary matter, the Court emphasized that "judicial powers may
be exercised only on the basis of a constitutional violation." Id. at 16. The Court stated that
where a constirational violation has been found, and the school authorities have defaulted on
their obligation to provide acceptable remedies, "a district court has broad power to fashion
a remedy that will assure a unitary school system." Id. See generally R. ROTUNDA, J. NowAX
& J. YOUNG, supra note 20, at 431-34.
50. 402 U.S. at 26.
51. Id. at 25, 28.
52. Id. at 28.
53. Id. at 30.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. See generalhy Jones, supra note 20, at 526. The Court's decision in Swann was unanimous.
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be the seed of later cases seeking to undo school busing and other court-
ordered desegregation remedies. The Court stated that:
At some point, these school authorities and others like them
should have achieved full compliance with this Court's decision
in Brown I. The systems would then be "unitary" in the sense
required by our decisions in Green and Alexander.
It does not follow that the communities served by such systems
will remain demographically stable, for in a growing, mobile society,
few will do so. Neither school authorities nor district courts are
constitutionally required to make year-by-year adjustments of the
racial composition of student bodies once the affirmative duty to
desegregate has been accomplished and racial discrimination
through official action is eliminated from the system. This does
not mean that federal courts are without power to deal with future
problems; but in the absence of a showing that either the school
authorities or some other agency of the State has deliberately at-
tempted to fix or alter demographic patterns to affect the racial
composition of the schools, further intervention by a district court
should not be necessary."7
Public reaction to the Swann decision was swift and largely hostile. 8
57. 402 U.S. at 31-32. This language has been widely read to imply that school districts had
an affirmative obligation to desegregate, rather than to integrate. See, e.g., Devins, supra note
20, at 17. In addition, as another commentator has stated, this language indicates that the Court
"determined that the duty to desegregate was a passing one." Lively, Separate But Equal: The
Low Road Reconsidered, 14 HASTINGS CoNsT. L.Q. 43, 65 (1986). As discussed in this article,
the effect of a finding of unitary status indicates that the duty to desegregate is indeed a passing one.
However, Swann does contain certain language suggesting the contrary. Earlier in the opinion
the Court stated that "[iln devising remedies where legally imposed segregation has been established,
it is the responsibility of local authorities and district court to see to it that future school con-
struction and abandonment are not used and do not serve to perpetuate or re-establish the dual
system." 402 U.S. at 21. See also Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 443 U.S. 526, 538 (1979)
(Dayton II). It has been argued that this language should be limited to school systems that have
not yet achieved unitary status. See, e.g., Note, Allocating the Burden of Proof After a Finding
of Unitariness in School Desegregation Litigation, 100 Hlv. L. Rv. 653, 656 n.21 (1987).
One commentator has suggested, however, that this language does imply "the need for some
form of safeguard against the re-establishment of the dual school system after a declaration
of unitariness." Id. at 656. "Returning Control Over School Board Decisions," infra, suggests
one such procedural safeguard.
58. Most significantly, then President Nixon and Congress sharply attacked busing. In a 1972
nationally televised address, President Nixon attacked "massive busing" and announced the in-
troduction of legislation to "call an immediate halt to all new busing orders by federal courts."
Address to the Nation on Equal Employment Opportunities and School Busing, PUB. PAPERS
OF PaRsmIEr RicsHan NIxoN 425-29 (1972). In 1974, President Ford expressed his opposition
to "forced busing." PuB. PAPERS OF PESmENT GEALD FORD 255 (1974). Further, in 1974,
Congress enacted the Esch Amendment to the Equal Educational Opportunity Act of 1974, which
prohibited any federal agency (including the courts) from ordering a desegregation plan that
required the transportation of students beyond the school closest or next closest to their homes.
20 U.S.C. § 1714(a) (1982). This broad language was narrowed by another provision of the amend-
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However, with few exceptions, 9 the Court did not retreat from its pronounce-
ments in Swann or its earlier cases. For example, in United States v. Scotland
Neck City Board of Education," the Court held that avoiding "white flight"
was not an acceptable reason for achieving "anything less than complete
uprooting of the dual school system." 6 Moreover, in Keyes v. School District
No. 1,62 the first desegregation case to reach the Court from a metropolitan
school district outside the South, 3 the Court held that school board actions
alone could constitute unconstitutional racial discrimination to the extent such
actions were motivated by "segregative purpose or intent.' 64 The Court fur-
ther held that a school board's purposeful segregation of a significant por-
tion of a school district justified a system-wide remedy to dismantle the dual
system. 65 Underlying the Court's decision in Keyes was its distinction between
de facto and de jure segregation-a distinction requiring desegregation only
where there has been "segregative purpose or intent" and governmental action
to maintain segregated schools.
66
ment that stated that the Act was not intended to modify or diminish the authority of the federal
courts to enforce the fifth and fourteenth amendments. 20 U.S.C. § 1702(b) (1982). See generally
Jones, supra nate 20, at 525; U.S. Comm'N oN Crvm Rxosrs, supra note 7, at 6-8; U.S. ComM'N
ON CIVIL RIGHTS, DESEGREGATION OF THE NATION's Ptrmuc ScHooLs: A STATUS REPORT, 8-13
(1979). Hostile- congressional action did not quickly abate. In 1979, for example, several bills
were introduced in Congress that sought to limit the ability of the Office of Civil Rights of
the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare to facilitate school desegregation through
busing. Jones, supra note 20, at 430 n.55.
59. See, e.g., Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974) (Milliken 1). The Court held in Milliken
I that the courts could not order busing between school districts absent a finding of an interdis-
trict constitutional violation. See also Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189 (1973), discussed
infra at notes 62-66.
60. 407 U.S. 484 (1972).
61. Id. at 491. The Court also held that desegregation could not be achieved by splitting
a single school system operating dual schools into two new systems that, although nominally
unitary, would preclude meaningful desegregation.
In addition, in Scotland Neck, and in Wright v. Council of Emporia, 407 U.S. 451 (1972),
decided the same day, the Court emphasized that the school board may not take any action
that has the effect of impeding desegregation.
62. 413 U.S. 189 (1973).
63. The Dnver, Colorado, school district in Keyes, unlike most of the school districts in
the South, had never operated under a constitutional or statutory provision that mandated racial
segregation in public schools. See supra note 27 and accompanying text. Thus, the Keyes case
was the Court's "first consideration of racial imbalance in a school system free from a history
of officially mandated racial assignment." Note, Reading the Mind of the School Board: Segregative
Intent and the De Facto/De Jure Distinction, 86 YALE L.J. 317, 318 (1976).
64. 413 U.S. at 208.
65. Id. at 203, 208. The Court thus created the "presumption" that system-wide segregative
intent exists where it is shown that intentionally segregative school board actions took place in
a meaningful portion of the school district. Id. at 208. A school district subject to this presump-
tion "must either desegregate its schools or satisfy the almost impossible burden of demonstrating
that the school system would have been segregated regardless of its conduct." Devins, supra
note 20, at 20.
66. 413 U.S. at 208. If a school district has become unintentionally segregated, e.g., because
of housing and migration patterns unconnected to any purposeful governmental action to racially
segregate schools, there is de facto segregation. De facto segregation is not unconstitutional and
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The next significant Supreme Court decision was Pasadena City Board of
Education v. Spangler.61 In Spangler the Court expanded on its cautionary
language in Swann that courts are not constitutionally required to make year-
by-year adjustments to the racial composition of schools. 6 The district court
had required the school district to annually readjust its attendance zones in
order to conform with an earlier court order mandating that no school have
a "majority of any minority students." 69 The Court held that the district court
was impermissibly requiring a "particular degree of racial balance or mix-
ing" which Swann expressly disapproved." The Court rejected the district
court's authority to impose such a requirement absent a showing that the school
board was responsible for intervening changes in the racial composition of
the schools. 71 The Court emphasized that "there are limits beyond which a
court may not go in seeking to dismantle a dual school system, '"' 7 and that
"absent a constitutional violation there would be no basis for judicially order-
ing assignment of students on a racial basis.""
courts will not intervene. R. ROTuNDA, J. NowAK & J. YouNG, supra note 20, at 413. However,
if a school district is segregated as a result of some purposeful governmental activity-whether
by state constitution or statute or by intentional school board action-there is de jure segrega-
tion. De jure segregation is a constitutional violation and it is the sole basis for judicial interven-
tion to remedy dual school systems. The Court's decision in Keyes expressly maintained the con-
stitutional distinction between de facto and de jure segregation and announced "segregative purpose
and intent" as the dividing line between the two. 413 U.S. at 214-17. Justices Douglas and Powell
dissented from the decision to maintain the distinction. Id. at 219-36.
Three years later the Court reaffirmed the Keyes requirement that a court must find some
intentional segregative conduct before ordering desegregation. Austin Indep. School Dist. v. United
States, 429 U.S. 990 (1976) (mem.). The Austin decision relied on Washington v. Davis, 426
U.S. 229 (1976), which held that absent a finding of intentional discrimination there could not
be a violation of the fourteenth amendment's equal protection clause.
Professor Lively has stated that Keyes, Milliken I, and certain language in Swann represent
three limiting principles announced by the Court to confine the reach of court-ordered desegregation.
Lively, supra note 57, at 58-66. These principles-"the de jure/de facto distinction, restrictions
upon interdistrict remedies, and the transitory nature of the duty to desegregate"-have "guided
the desegregation mandate's devolution." Id. at 58 & n.99. These decisions-especially Keyes
and Milliken I-unquestionably represent a retreat from the Court's earlier insistence that desegrega-
tion remedies must be effective. See, e.g., id. at 63-64.
67. 427 U.S. 424 (1976).
68. See supra note 57 and accompanying text. The Swann and Spangler decisions represent
all that the Supreme Court has said about the termination of federal court oversight of school
desegregation. See generally Gewirtz, Choice in the Transition: School Desegregation and the
Corrective Ideal, 86 CoLum. L. REv. 728, 791-93 (1986).
69. 427 U.S. at 428 (quoting Spangler v. Pasadena City Bd. of Educ., 311 F. Supp. 501,
505 (D. Cal. 1970)).
70. Id. at 434 (quoting Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 24 (1971)).
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. (quoting Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 28 (1971)). The
district court had the original authority to order the reassignment of students on the basis of
race because of its 1970 finding of constitutional violations. The court's plan resulted in a ra-
cially neutral system. It was not a "step-by-step plan" or one expressly subject to periodic revi-
sion. Accordingly, because the school board was not responsible for the demographic shifts that
caused the schools to slip out of compliance, the court had no authority to order it to readjust
the school attendance figures.
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The Spangler decision is important for reasons other than its expansion
of the limiting language in Swann. The Court also appeared to have divided
the concept of a unitary school system into component parts that can be treated
separately. The Court stated that "lilt may well be that petitioners have not
yet totally achieved a unitary system," 74 implying that when "one component
of 'unitariness' has been achieved, even briefly, a district court may be deprived
of power to continue policing that sphere of school policy.""
'
At the end of the Supreme Court's 1978-79 term, the Court issued its final
major school desegregation decisions.76 The Court emphasized that if a school
system was dual in 1954 there is a continuing duty to eradicate the effects
of the prior intentional discrimination. 77 The Court stated that a school board
had a duty to do more than simply abandon its prior discriminatory pur-
pose. 78 If a dual system once existed and no effort is made to establish a
unitary system, the school board remains under a duty to undo the segregative
effects, even if the initial segregative decisions occurred more than twenty
years ago. As one commentator noted, the Court "extended the Keyes
presumption from focusing solely on the location of segregation ... to in-
quiring about the time of segregation." ' 79 After 1979 the lower federal courts
were left on their own to further untangle the hundreds of school desegrega-
tion cases that remained within their jurisdiction.
74. Id. at 436. The Court recognized a factual dispute as to whether the school board had
complied with the plan to end discrimination in hiring and promotions.
75. The Supreme Court, 1975 Term, 90 HAmv: L. REv. 56, 223 (1976). The concept of "par-
tial unitary status," suggested in Spangler, is addressed infra in "The Effect of a Finding of
Unitary Status on Plaintiffs." See infra notes 174-175 and accompanying text.
76. Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 443 U.S. 526 (1979) (Dayton I]); Columbus Bd. of
Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449 (1979).
In 1982 the Court addressed the issue of whether a state could amend its constitution to pro-
hibit its state courts from ordering busing to remedy de facto segregation. Crawford v. Board
of Educ., 458 U.S. 527 (1982). The Court held that the amendment did not violate the four-
teenth amendment. See also Washington v. Seattle School Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457 (1982) (striking
down state initiative prohibiting school boards from requiring busing in certain circumstances).
Neither Crawford nor Washington involved busing orders by federal courts or other federal court
.remedies.
77. Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 443 U.S. 526, 537 (1979) (Dayton 11). The Court
stated that
[g]iven intentionally segregated schools in 1954 ... the Board was thereafter under
a continuoas duty to eradicate the effects of that system, and ... the systemwide
nature of the violation furnished prima facie proof that current segregation in the
Dayton schools was caused at least in part by prior intentionally segregative of-
ficial acts.
Id. (citations omitted). In other words, pre-1954 de jure segregation presented a prima facie
case that current segregation was also de jure.
The Court in Dayton II also emphasized that the measure of the school board's conduct was
its effectiveness-not its purpose-and that the school board had a "heavy burden" of "show-
ing that actions that increased or continued the effects of the dual system serve important and
legitimate ends." Id. at 538. See infra notes 90 & 93 and accompanying text.
78. 443 U.S. at 538.
79. Devins, supra note 20, at 22.
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The Effect of the Initial Implementation
of School Desegregation Remedies
In the early Supreme Court school desegregation cases, the Court repeatedly
stated that school boards have the affirmative duty to take whatever steps
are necessary to convert to a unitary system.80 When the school boards failed
to achieve unitary school systems, the lower federal courts used their broad
equitable powers to order that specific desegregation plans be implemented.
The courts recognized from the beginning, however, "that a school system
is not automatically desegregated when a constitutionally acceptable plan is
adopted and implemented." 8' Rather, "public school officials have a contin-
uing duty to eliminate the system-wide effects of earlier discrimination and
to create a unitary school system untainted by the past." '82 Further, the Supreme
Court has made it clear that the district courts should retain jurisdiction until
the state-imposed segregation has been completely removed.83
Thus, the implementation of a school desegregation plan does not, by itself,
terminate a school desegregation case. It is only a means to the constitutionally
required end of having a unitary school system. Accordingly, after a finding
of unlawful de jure segregation, the first step toward the eventual relinquish-
80. See, e.g., supra notes 40 & 77 and accompanying text.
81. United States v. Texas Educ. Agency, 647 F.2d 504, 508 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied,
454 U.S. 1143 (1982). Accord Ross v. Houston Indep. School Dist., 699 F.2d 218, 225 (5th
Cir. 1983). In United States v. Texas Education Agency the district court held that the school
district was a unitary system from the moment the court entered its original desegregation order.
The Fifth Circuit reversed, stating that the school system is not unitary until the effects of the
prior discriminatory dual system are eliminated. 647 F.2d at 508.
Professor Gewirtz has similarly recognized that
desegregation is not "accomplished" as soon as a desegregation plan is adopted.
A "plan" is just that: a proposal that anticipates success but neither guarantees
success nor brings it about immediately. Thus, "accomplishment" of desegrega-
tion requires that a plan be fully implemented and kept in place for a period of time.
Gewirtz, supra note 68, at 792-93 (footnote omitted).
82. Ross v. Houston Indep. School Dist., 699 F.2d at 225 (citing Swann v. Charlotte-
Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 15 (1971)). See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
83. See, e.g., Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 439 (1968); Brown v. Board of
Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955) (Brown I1). See also supra note 47 and accompanying text.
As one commentator has noted:
District courts commonly retain jurisdiction over school desegregation suits to assure
that court orders are applied correctly, and to monitor actions taken after "the
rendition of judgment that may increase segregation in the school system." The
retention of jurisdiction is especially important in school desegregation cases because
resistance and evasion are common, and meaningful relief may be delayed for years
after a court's finding of a constitutional violation.
Note, 49 GEo. NVASH. L. REv., supra note 17, at 101-02 n.13 (citations omitted). See also United
States v. South Park Indep. School Dist., 566 F.2d 1221, 1225 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S.
1007 (1978) (The court noted that under the original desegregation plan the district court retained
jurisdiction over the school system and that the retention of jurisdiction "was a normal and
necessary procedure taken to insure the implementation of the plan and the achievement of the
goal-a 'unitary' school system." During this time, "the case remained 'active' under the district
court's jurisdiction.").
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ment of federal court supervision over the school system is the implementa-
tion of a desegregation plan. The case will be concluded and federal court
jurisdiction will end only after the court specifically finds that the school system
has in fact achieved unitary status."'
In most school desegregation cases, a substantial period of time passes be-
tween the implementation of a desegregation plan and the achievement of
unitary status." During this period of time, the remedial power of a federal
court that adopts a desegregation plan is not limited to the enforcement of
the details of the original plan."1 Instead, the court can modify the desegrega-
tion plan to eliinate "vestiges of segregation that remain or become appar-
ent only after the plan has been put into place." 87
The school board, however, may not unilaterally modify the desegregation
plan." A court-approved remedial plan may not be amended without the
court's approvad, and the approval must be based on a showing by the school
board that its proposal is consistent with its affirmative duty to eliminate
discrimination. 9 The school board has a "heavy burden" of showing that
its modification plan does not "serve to perpetuate or re-establish the dual
school system." 9 The school board may not, for example, justify continued
racial imbalance in the schools, or a racial imbalance that would result from
Although the district court normally retains jurisdiction over the case at least until the school
system has been declared unitary, the degree of the court's actual control over the school board
during the period prior to a finding of unitary status may vary. For example, the court may
exercise near complete control, or may reduce its control to give the school board sufficient
freedom to make adaptations to accommodate changed circumstances. See, e.g., Keyes v. School
Dist. No. 1, 653 F. Supp. 1536, 1539-40 (D. Colo. 1987) (The degree of court control "depends
upon the extent of compliance" with the duty "to meet the requirements of federal law.").
This flexibility in the degree of court control prior to a finding of unitary status follows from
the Supreme Court's admonition in Swann that "breadth and flexibility are inherent in equitable
remedies." 402 U.S. 1, 15 (1971).
84. See, e.g., Pitts v. Freeman, 755 F.2d 1423, 1426 (11th Cir. 1985).
85. See generally supra note 17.
86. United States v. Lawrence County School Dist., 799 F.2d 1031, 1043 (5th Cir. 1986).
87. Id.
88. See, e.g., Mims v. Duval County School Bd., 784 F.2d 1107, 1108 (11th Cir. 1986) (per
curiam). In addition, an injunctive order mandating school desegregation is binding upon both
the current and future school boards. See, e.g., Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 653 F. Supp. 1536,
1539-40 (D. Colo. 1987).
89. See, e.g., Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 443 U.S. 526, 538 (1979) (Dayton I]); Wright
v. Council of Emporia, 407 U.S. 451 (1972); Mims v. Duval County School Bd., 784 F.2d 1107,
1108-09 (11th Cir. 1986) (per curiam).
90. Clark v. Board of Educ., 705 F.2d 265, 271 (8th Cir. 1983). See also Adams v. Board
of Pub. Educ., 770 F.2d 1562 (1lth Cir. 1985). The burden is not "heavy" in theory and fatal
in fact. The Supreme Court has stated that school board actions that increase or continue the
effects of the dual system must be shown to serve "important and legitimate ends." Dayton
Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 443 U.S. 526, 538 (1979) (Dayton 11). See generally Note, 100 HAtv.
L. REv., supra note 57, at 657, 660. In Adams, for example, the court held that the school
board had met its burden of proving that its closing of certain predominantly black elementary
schools was consistent with its duties under an earlier court-approved consent decree.
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its proposal, on demographic changes or "white flight."9 Accordingly, until
unitary status has been achieved the school board has the burden of showing
that any board proposal modifying the court's desegregation plan is consis-
tent with the goal of desegregation.
Thus, prior to a finding of unitary status, plaintiffs may successfully
challenge school board action affecting the desegregation of the schools without
a further showing of discriminatory intent. 92 Instead, plaintiffs must only show
that the challenged school board action has a discriminatory effect. Official
action that has the effect of perpetuating or reestablishing a dual school system
violates the school board's continuing duty to eliminate the consequences of
its prior unconstitutional conduct. Therefore, such official action may be en-
joined even if it is not motivated by a discriminatory purpose because it is
presumed that such segregative effects result from past discriminatory acts.93
It is the achievement of unitary status, not the initial implementation of a
school desegregation plan, that shifts the burden of proving discriminatory
intent back to the plaintiffs. 94
In sum, the implementation of a school desegregation plan is the begin-
ning, not the end, of federal court oversight of the school board's constitu-
tional duty to eliminate the dual school system. The mere adoption of a
desegregation plan does not satisfy this duty. The school board is not barred
from changing the desegregation plan, but to do so it must convince the court
91. Valley v. Rapides Parish School Bd., 646 F.2d 925, 937 (5th Cir. 1981). Until a school
system has achieved unitary status, desegregation may not be thwarted by "extra-legal action."
Id. See also United States v. Scotland Neck City Bd. of Educ., 407 U.S. 484 (1972); supra notes
60-61.
92. See, e.g., Georgia State Conf. of Branches of NAACP v. Georgia, 775 F.2d 1403, 1414
(11th Cir. 1985). Normally, proof of discriminatory intent is required to establish a violation
of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment, e.g., plaintiffs bear this burden
in originally bringing suit challenging a segregated school system. See, e.g., Washington v. Davis,
426 U.S. 229 (1976). See also Note, 100 HARv. L. REv., supra note 57, at 653. Plaintiffs burden
in challenging school board action taken subsequent to a finding of unitary status is addressed
infra in "The Effect of a Finding of Unitary Status on Plaintiffs."
93. See, e.g., Wright v. Council of Emporia, 407 U.S. 451, 462 (1972) ("The existence of
a permissible purpose cannot sustain an action that has an impermissible effect."). See also Dayton
Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 443 U.S. 526 (1979) (Dayton I1); Vaughns v. Board of Educ., 758
F.2d 983, 991 (4th Cir. 1985); Pitts v. Freeman, 755 F.2d 1423, 1427 (11th Cir. 1985). "If the
defendants fail to show that the challenged action serves 'important and legitimate ends,' ...
that action can be enjoined solely on the basis of its effect-that is, the absence of wrongful
intent on the part of the school authorities is irrelevant." Note, 100 HAgv. L. Rv., supra note
57, at 660 (citing Dayton II).
For example, in Vaughns the court stated that "[b]ecause the County's school system had
not attained unitary status, it is settled law that plaintiffs were entitled to a presumption that
current... [racial] disparities were causally related to prior segregation." 758 F.2d at 991. Thus,
plaintiffs were not required to prove discriminatory intent with regard to the school board's
special education proposal. But see infra note 163. "This presumption reflects the Court's deter-
mination to err on the side of overprotecting the rights of the victims of state-sanctioned school
segregation; in cases of uncertainty, the presumption calls for judgment against the school board."
Note, supra, at 657.
94. See infra "The Effect of a Finding of Unitary Status on Plaintiffs."
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that the proposed changes are consistent with its continuing affirmative duty
to eliminate racial discrimination. The ultimate goal is the achievement of
unitary status. Mere adoption of a desegregation plan is not enough to satisfy
the school board's duty to desegregate; the plan must also be shown to have
worked.
The Beginning of the End of Federal Court Oversight:
The Finding of Unitary Status
The beginning of the end of federal court oversight of a school system sub-
ject to a desegregation plan is a judicial finding that the school system has
achieved "unitary status." As the Supreme Court recognized in Green,91 the
goal of school desegregation is the transition of a dual school system into
a unitary one. The Court contemplated in Swann that at some point formerly
dual school systems would be in compliance with their constitutional duties
and further intervention by the federal courts would not be necessary. 96
The implementation of a school desegregation plan does not automatically
render a school system unitary. 97 The district court must hold a hearing to
determine whether the school board has in fact achieved unitary status." At
the hearing the school board has the burden of proving that the vestiges of
past unlawful segregation have been eliminated, i.e., that the desegregation
plan worked. 9 In Green the Supreme Court identified six components of a
school system that must be desegregated before the school system can achieve
unitary status. These components are faculty, staff, transportation, extracur-
ricular activities, facilities, and composition of the student body. 1" 0 Thus, to
95. 391 U.S. 430 (1968). See generally supra notes 39-43 and accompanying text.
96. 402 U.S. 1 (1971). See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
97. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
98. See, e.g., Pitts v. Freeman, 755 F.2d 1423, 1426 (1lth Cir. 1985); Tasby v. Wright, 713
F.2d 90, 96 (5th Cir. 1983). In Pitts the court held that the district court erred in characterizing
a previously dual school system as unitary where no hearing was held to determine whether the
school system had achieved unitary status.
In addition, the district court's holding that a school system has achieved unitary status must
detail sufficient findings of fact to allow a reviewing court to determine whether the school system
meets the requirements of Swann and other Supreme Court cases. See, e.g., United States v.
South Park Indep, School Dist., 566 F.2d 1221, 1225 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1007
(1978) (case remanded for supplemental findings of fact to determine whether the school system
had in fact achieved unitary status).
99. See, e.g., Tasby v. Wright, 713 F.2d 90, 96 (5th Cir. 1983).
100. Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 435 (1968).
Several commentators have recognized the difficulty in determining when a dual school district
has been sufficiently dismantled to be declared unitary. As Professor Gewirtz has noted, "in
a general sense, 'unitary status' is reached when the defendant shows that continuing effects
of its past discrimination have been eliminated and the prospects of future discrimination have
dissipated." Gewirtz, supra note 68, at 792. He adds that the "Court has not given practical
guidance on how to identify that moment." Id. Other commentators have expressed more frustra-
tion. See, e.g.. Srediey, supra note 17, at 405-06 ("After some thousand decisions handed down
by a hundred or more judges over a period of nearly two decades, the applicable standard [to
determine what constitutes a unitary system] is unclear."); Note, School Desegregation After
Swann: A Theory of Government Responsibility, 39 U. Cm. L. Ray. 421, 436 (1972) ("At what
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achieve unitary status, all aspects of the public education system must be freed
of the effects of state-sponsored racial segregation. 1 Ending de jure segrega-
tion and its effects is not solely a matter of whether white children and black
children go to school together.
The Riddick and Dowell cases provide examples of how a finding of unitary
status is made and when such a finding is made in the typical school desegrega-
tion case.102 In Riddick the underlying litigation to desegregate the Norfolk
public schools began in 1956. In 1970 the Fourth Circuit upheld a finding
that the Norfolk School Board continued to operate a dual school system
based on race. 03 As a result, in 1971 a new desegregation plan was adopted.
This plan utilized several methods of pupil assignment, including pairing and
clustering of schools and cross-town busing." 4 In 1975, four years after the
most recent desegregation plan was adopted and nineteen years after the
underlying desegregation action was commenced, the district court determined
that racial discrimination had been eliminated from the school system and
that the system had become unitary.'
In a 1984 decision chiefly addressing the Norfolk School Board's plan to
curtail busing, the district court reaffirmed its 1975 finding of unitary status
and stated that the school district had retained its unitary character.0 6 The
court stated that the Norfolk School Board was an integrated body, the school
administration was racially balanced, the racial composition of the faculty
point a dual system is sufficiently dismantled to become 'unitary' remains a great mystery.").
See generally Craven, supra note 17, at 1-2; Note, 49 Gao. WASH. L. REv., supra note 17, at
105-06 n.46.
One commentator, also recognizing that the Court has not "produced a single, comprehensive
statement defining unitariness," stated that the Court "refrained from offering such a statement
because it has recognized that no single, inflexible formula could apply to all school systems."
Note, 100 HAiv. L. REv., supra note 57, at 662-63. This view properly recognizes that no two
desegregation cases are alike and that each must be resolved in light of its particular facts.
Despite these perceived difficulties, courts do recognize that the goal of desegregation is to
achieve unitary status, and they examine the components noted in Green to determine whether
the school system is sufficiently desegregated. Dowell and Riddick, discussed herein, are but
two examples. See also Bradley v. Baliles, 639 F. Supp. 680, 687-88 (E.D. Va. 1986) (court stated
that the "traditional test for determining whether a school district has achieved unitary status
is that which was enunciated" in Green, and that only the factors mentioned in Green need
be considered in determining whether a particular school system had achieved unitary status).
Cf. Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 653 F. Supp. 1536, 1541 (D. Colo. 1987) (court adopted specific
definition of a unitary school system for the particular case).
101. See infra note 116 and accompanying text for a discussion of partial unitary status. See
also supra note 75 and accompanying text.
102. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
103. Brewer v. School Bd., 434 F.2d 408 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 929 (1970).
104. Riddick v. School Bd., 784 F.2d 521, 525 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 420 (1986).
105. Id. The court's 1975 order and its underlying findings are unpublished. A later decision
in the same case, however, reprinted the order, which states in part that "racial discrimination
through official action has been eliminated from the system, and that the Norfolk School System
is now 'unitary'." Riddick v. School Bd., 627 F. Supp. 814, 818 (E.D. Va. 1984), aff'd, 784
F.2d 521 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 420 (1986).
106. Riddick v. School Bd., 627 F. Supp. at 819.
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and staff was mixed, and the overwhelming majority of schoolchildren at all
levels attended schools with racially mixed student bodies. 0 7 The court also
noted that extracurricular activities, the transportation network, and the school
facilities were not operated in a dual fashion. 100 In short, the court reviewed
all of the factors set forth in Green in determining that the school system
was free of racial discrimination and was in fact unitary. °9
In Dowell the original desegregation action against the Oklahoma City school
system was filed in 1961. In 1972 the district court implemented a new
desegregation plan that provided for the restructuring of certain attendance
zones and busing. Then, in 1975 the school board moved the court for a find-
ing that the school system had become unitary. The district court held a hear-
ing to receive evidence from the parties on the state of desegregation efforts
in the schools. Finally, in 1977 the court issued an order finding that the
Oklahoma City school system had achieved unitary status." 0 The court
"specifically found that the School Board had complied with the requisite
constitutional requirements and recognized that a 'unitary system' had been
'accomplished' over the previous sixteen years."''
Although Green made it clear that unitary status is not solely a matter of
whether black children and white children go to school together, the most
common reason why a court finds that a school system is not unitary is the
continued existence of a disproportionately large number of one-race schools." 2
This is not surprising because the plaintiffs in Brown I and later cases sought
chiefly to end the pernicious system of relegating blacks to separate all-black
schools. In United States v. Texas Education Agency," 3 for example, the Fifth
Circuit held that a desegregation plan failed to convert a school system to
unitary status where ten out of eleven one-race schools remained predominantly
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. On appeal, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's finding that the school system
had achieved, and continued to maintain, unitary status. Riddick v. School Bd., 784 F.2d at
533. In Bradley v. ailes, 639 F. Supp. 680, 688 (E.D. Va. 1986), the court stated that because
the Fourth Circuit in Riddick limited its inquiry to the factors mentioned in Green, the court
need not consider additional factors in determining whether a school system is unitary.
The court of appeals' standard of review of district court findings of unitary status is governed
by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 52(a). Riddick v. School Bd., 784 F.2d at 533. Rule
52(a) states that findings of fact may be set aside only if clearly erroneous. Thus, "[f]actual
findings by a district court in school desegregation cases ... are entitled to great deference on
review." Id.
110. The court's findings and order are unpublished. The order is quoted in part in Dowell
v. Board of Educ., 606 F. Supp. 1548, 1551 (W.D. Okla. 1985), rev'd, 795 F.2d 1516 (10th
Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 420 (1986).
111. Dowell v. Board of Educ., 606 F. Supp. at 1554. In a later decision in the same case,
the district court referred to the six factors set forth in Green in stating that the court's 1977
finding of unitary status was fully justified. Id. at 1555.
112. This is true even though in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Educ., 402 U.S.
1, 26 (1971), the Court stated that "the existence of some small number of one-race, or virtually
one-race, schools within a district is not in and of itself the mark of a system that still practices
segregation by law."
113. 647 F.2d 504 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1143 (1982).
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one race nine years after the plan was adopted. Similarly, in United States
v. Board of Education,"" the Fifth Circuit held that the fact that three out
of seven elementary schools remained more than 90 percent black five years
after a desegregation plan was adopted precluded a finding that the school
system had achieved unitary status. These cases suggest that desegregation
of the student body is the central focus of school desegregation efforts and
that a judicial finding of unitary status is not casually made."'
Some courts have found, however, that the existence of a large number
of racially identifiable schools, or other remaining racially identifiable com-
ponents of the school system, do not preclude a finding of unitary status.",
For example, in Ross v. Houston Independent School District,"7 the court
considered whether the school system had become unitary despite a failure
to achieve integrated student attendance. A desegregation plan had been in
operation for twelve years that resulted in a unitary school system in every
respect except for the large number of one-race schools." ' The court held
that the school system was properly declared unitary.'9 The court stated that
the "constitutional mandate against racial discrimination is categoric, but the
determination of remedies for its past violation turns on the conditions in
a particular district."'
2 0
The court added that "the decision that public officials have satisfied their
responsibility to eradicate segregation and its vestiges must be based on con-
ditions in the district, the accomplishments to date, and the feasibility of fur-
ther measures."'' The court recognized that Swann did not require "a racial
balance in all of the schools.""'2 Thus, the court concluded that because the
school board had made "intense efforts" to remedy school attendance pat-
114. 576 F.2d 37 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1007 (1978).
115. See also Tasby v. Wright, 713 F.2d 90 (5th Cir. 1983) (school district not unitary given
number of one-race schools); Valley v. Rapides Parish School Bd., 646 F.2d 925 (5th Cir. 1981),
cert. denied, 455 U.S. 939 (1982) (despite fifteen years of desegregation efforts, continued exist-
ence of one-race schools precluded finding of unitary status). In most cases, given the central
purpose of school desegregation actions, it is unlikely that a court would recognize the achieve-
ment of unitary status where the school system was unitary in all respects but student body,
and student assignments continued to result in a substantial number of one-race schools. Com-
pare Ross v. Houston Indep. School Dist., 699 F.2d 218 (5th Cir. 1983), discussed infra at notes
117-124.
The converse is also true, but for a different reason. By listing the six components of the
school system that must be desegregated to achieve unitary status, the Supreme Court in Green
strongly implied that a school system should not ordinarily be declared unitary where the student
body has been desegregated but the other components have not. See supra note 100 and accom-
panying text.
116. See, e.g., Ross v. Houston Indep. School Dist., 699 F.2d 218 (5th Cir. 1983); Mapp
v. Board of Educ., 630 F. Supp. 876 (E.D. Tenn. 1986).
117. 699 F.2d 218 (5th Cir. 1983).
118. Id. at 226. The court specifically found that faculty assignments, transportation, extracur-
ricular activities, and facilities had been desegregated.
119. Id. at 228.
120. Id. at 227.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 227-28. See also supra note 112.
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terns and because demographic changes precluded further student body in-
tegration without disrupting naturally integrated schools,' the school system
had been properly declared unitary.
24
The Ross case suggests that the factual complexity and uniqueness of each
school desegregation case may account for a failure to strictly adhere to the
Supreme Court's mandate in Green and that a blanket test for unitariness
cannot be applied to every case. The case may also suggest the recognition
of the Court's implication in Spangler that a school system may achieve par-
tial unitary status.1' 5 In either event, courts do not examine the six Green
factors in a vacuum; where further desegregation measures may be "im-
practical and detrimental to education," a finding of unitary status may be
made despite a failure to desegregate every facet of the school system.2 6 In
practice, a finding of unitary status is guided by, but not constrained by,
an analysis of the six Green factors-a victory of substance over form.
Despite the holding in Ross, the case is indicative of the efforts school boards
and courts must make to have a school system declared unitary. The finding
of unitary status in Ross was made twenty-five years after the initial lawsuit
was filed to desegregate the Houston schools and twelve years after a suitable
court-ordered desegregation plan was adopted. This indicates that the adop-
tion of a desegregation plan is not the end of federal court oversight of the
school system and that the court will not lightly infer that the desegregation
plan actually worked. Moreover, the mere passage of time cannot itself be
evidence of desegregation. The finding of unitary status, guided by the fac-
tors set forth in Green, must be based on specific findings that the school
system's operations are free of past racial taint. The burden is on the school
board to establish that it has fulfilled its constitutional duty. When a finding
of unitary status is finally made, the next phase of the school desegregation
case begins. W
The Effect of a Finding of Unitary Status
A judicial finding of unitary status, by definition, indicates that the
desegregation plan worked and the school board has fulfilled its affirmative
duty to eliminate the effects of its prior unconstitutional conduct. As a result,
the rights and responsibilities of the parties to the desegregation case, as well
as the court's role in overseeing the school system, are significantly affected.
First, the court's role is substantially diminished because the court's use of
123. As to a schcol board's consideration of demographic changes in remedying school segrega-
tion prior to a finding of unitary status, compare Valley v. Rapides Parish School Board, 646
F.2d 925, 937 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 939 (1982) ("White flight," residential
patterns, and "extra-legal" action cannot justify the continued existence of one-race schools.).
See also supra note- 91 and accompanying text.
124. See Mapp v. Board of Educ., 630 F. Supp. 876 (E.D. Tenn. 1986). In Mapp the court
held that a school system was unitary despite unremedied racially identifiable faculty and staff.
125. See supra note 75 and accompanying text and infra notes 174-175 and accompanying text.
126. Ross v. Houston Indep. School Dist., 699 F.2d 218, 228 (5th Cir. 1983). These cases,
however, are the ecception.
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its remedial powers necessarily depends on the existence of unremedied con-
stitutional violations. Second, the control of the school system is returned
to the school board, and the board is free to take administrative action without
prior court approval and without the presumption that any segregative ef-
fects are vestiges of its past unlawful discrimination. One such action may
be to cut back on previously court-ordered busing.' Finally, as a general
matter, plaintiffs challenging a school board action that appears resegregative
must prove a new discriminatory intent on the part of the school board. In
addition, such plaintiffs are collaterally estopped from relitigating the issue
of the unitary character of the school system.
These effects are interrelated and represent a return to the state of the world
that exists for any school system free of a racially discriminatory past. These
effects also underlie the seemingly contradictory decisions in Riddick and
Dowell concerning a school board's power to end busing after a finding of
unitary status. The court's holding in Riddick that a school board can end
busing indicates that the plaintiffs, the school board, and the court operate
under a different set of assumptions after the school system has been declared
unitary. 28
The Effect of a Finding of Unitary Status on the Role of the Court
Once a school system has achieved unitary status, a court may not further
interfere with the affairs of the school board and may not make further
remedial orders. 129 The court's judicial power may be exercised only on the
basis of a constitutional violation and in the absence of such a violation, the
school board's powers are plenary.' 30 The responsibility for educational deci-
sions thus returns to the public school officials. This does not mean, however,
that the court's jurisdiction ends and the case is dismissed, unless the court
specifically so provides.
1 3 '
The Supreme Court recognized in several cases that the court's role in super-
127. See supra notes 1-2 and accompanying text.
128. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
129. See, e.g., Vaughns v. Board of Educ., 758 F.2d 983 (4th Cir. 1985). "A district court's
jurisdiction to grant further relief in school desegregation cases is not perpetual.... Once a
school system has achieved unitary status, a court may not order further relief to counteract
resegregation that does not result from the school system's intentionally discriminatory acts."
Id. at 988. See also Oliver v. Kalamazoo Bd. of Educ., 640 F.2d 782, 808 (6th Cir. 1980). See
generally Lively, supra note 57, at 55 n.78 ("Once a school system achieves unitary status, a
court may not order further relief in response to subsequent changes in neighborhood ethnicity,
so-called immutable geographic factors, or demographic shifts for which the system is not held
accountable."); Note, 100 HARv. L. Rav., supra note 57, at 661 ("Direct court supervision lasts
only as long as vestiges of the dual system persist.").
130. See, e.g., Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 16 (1971).
131. See, e.g., Dowell v. Board of Educ., 606 F. Supp. 1548, 1551 (W.D. Okla. 1985), rev'd,
795 F.2d 1516 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 420 (1986) (court order finding unitary status
also relinquished court's jurisdiction and terminated the case); Mapp v. Board of Educ., 648
F. Supp. 992 (E.D. Tenn. 1986) (court dismissed case after finding that last component of school
system, faculty and staff, had become desegregated; court had previously recognized partial unitary
status with the exception of faculty and staff). Thus, the court may close the docket on the
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vising a school system is substantially diminished when the system becomes
unitary. In Swann the Court stated that after a school system is unitary district
courts are not "constitutionally required to make year-by-year adjustments
of the racial composition of student bodies."' 32 The Court implied that the
court's power to redress future problems must be based on new constitutional
violations by the school board. In Spangler the Court similarly recognized
that a federal court's remedial powers end when the objective sought has been
achieved.3 3 Thus, the Fourth Circuit, citing Swann and Spangler, stated that
"[a] district court's jurisdiction to grant further relief is not . . . perpetual.
Once a school system has achieved unitary status, a court may not order fur-
ther relief to counter-act [sic] resegregation that does not result from the school
system's intentionally discriminatory acts.'
' 34
Although a finding of unitary status greatly diminishes the role of the federal
court, the court may retain jurisdiction to "assure the maintenance of a unitary
system."" 35 This is frequently done by requiring the filing of statistical reports
on an established schedule. 136 The court may also retain jurisdiction to en-
force its outstanding orders.' 3 For example, in Dowell the court blocked the
case after the finding of unitary status. Lee v. Macon County Bd. of Educ., 584 F.2d 78, 81
(5th Cir. 1978).
However, the courts should, and often do, retain jurisdiction for a short period of time to
assure that new ditcrimination does not occur. See generally infra notes 135-142 and accompany-
ing text. See also Gewirtz, supra note 68, at 793-94 n.209. This procedure underlies the proposal
set forth infra.
If the court does expressly terminate its jurisdiction, it retains the discretion to reopen the
case under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6). See, e.g., Dowell v. Board of Educ., 606
F. Supp. at 1557. Under this rule, a court, on a motion, may relieve a party from a final judg-
ment or order for any reason that appears just.
132. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 31-32 (1971).
133. Pasadena City Bd. of Educ. v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424 (1976). See supra note 67 and
accompanying text.
134. Vaughns v. Board of Educ., 758 F.2d 983, 988 (4th Cir. 1985). See also United States
v. South Park Indep. School Dist., 566 F.2d 1221, 1224 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1007
(1978) (The finding of unitary status is crucial "because once it is made a federal court loses'
its power to remedy the lingering vestiges of past discrimination absent a showing that either
the school authorities or the state had deliberately attempted to fix or alter demographic patterns
to affect the racial composition of the schools.").
The result of Swann and Spangler is that after a finding of unitary status, "resegregation
is constitutionally permissible unless found to be the product of intentional official action."
Lively, supra note 57, at 72.
135. See, e.g., Pate v. Dade County School Bd., 588 F.2d 501 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444
U.S. 835 (1979). This broad language should not be construed to permit the court to redress
resegregative effects that were not caused by intentional school board action. See, e.g., supra
note 134 and accompanying text. But see Mapp v. Board of Educ., 648 F. Supp. 992, 993 (E.D.
Tenn. 1986) ("[T]his court is satisfied that unlawful segregation ... no longer exists. Based
upon their conduct for many years, there is no indication that the defendants will take any steps
to reinstitute vestiges of segregation. There is thus no demonstrated need to further monitor
compliance with orders of this Court.").
136. See, e.g., Lee v. Macon County Bd. of Educ., 584 F.2d 78 (5th Cir. 1978).
137. Dowell v. Board of Educ., 795 F.2d 1516, 1520 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct.
420 (1986). In s;uch a case, full control over the school system returns to the school board only
[Vol. 40:519
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol40/iss4/11
1987] DESEGREGATION AND UNITARY STATUS 541
school board's plan to end busing on the basis that the finding of unitary
status did not automatically dissolve its prior decrees.138 Thus, while a find-
ing of unitary status ends the court's active supervision of the case, it does
not end its power to ensure compliance with its injunctions that have not
been dissolved.
The Fifth Circuit established a procedure for the district courts to follow
to finally dismiss a school desegregation case. In Youngblood v. Board of
Public Instruction,139 the court vacated a district court order dismissing a school
desegregation case after making a finding that the school system had achieved
unitary status. The court held that when a school system is declared unitary
the district court must retain jurisdiction over the case for at least three addi-
tional school years. During these years the school district is required to file
semiannual reports with the court setting forth statistical information on the
racial balance of various components of the school system's operations. 4 '
At the conclusion of three years, the court may consider whether the case should
be dismissed. The court may not, however, dismiss the action without notice
to the plaintiffs and a hearing providing the plaintiffs the opportunity to show
cause why dismissal of the case should be further delayed. 1' Subsequent Fifth
and Eleventh Circuit cases have embraced the Youngblood procedures in deter-
mining whether a court should terminate its jurisdiction over the case.'4 2
In sum, the courts uniformly hold that while the finding of unitary status
does not necessarily terminate the court's jurisdiction, it does greatly reduce
the court's remedial powers. There is, by definition, nothing left to be remedied
by the court. The court may retain jurisdiction to ensure maintenance of the
unitary system by school board compliance with outstanding orders, but it
may not make new remedial orders absent proof of new constitutional viola-
tions. In a unitary system, the school board, not the federal court, runs the
schools.
after the court has declared the school system unitary and has terminated any outstanding in-
junctions. See, e.g., Note, 100 HARv. L. REv., supra note 57, at 661. See also infra "Decision
to End Busing."
138. The Dowell case is discussed in detail infra.
139. 448 F.2d 770 (5th Cir. 1971) (per curiam).
140. Id. at 771. The reports are to be similar to those required in United States v. Hinds
County School Bd., 433 F.2d 611, 618-19 (5th Cir. 1970).
141. 448 F.2d at 771.
142. See, e.g., Ross v. Houston Indep. School Dist., 699 F.2d 218 (5th Cir. 1983); United
States v. Texas Educ. Agency, 647 F.2d 504 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1143 (1982).
Some of these cases, however, have applied the Youngblood procedures to a finding of unitary
status, not to a decision to dismiss the case after a finding of unitary status. See, e.g., Pitts
v. Freeman, 755 F.2d 1423, 1426 (11th Cir. 1985). In either case, the courts have consistently
required a hearing to determine whether the case should be finally dismissed. The final section
of this article suggests the universal application of a similar procedure to the decision to dismiss
the case after the finding of unitary status.
It should be noted that decisions of the Fifth Circuit prior to the creation of the Eleventh
Circuit are binding precedent in the Eleventh Circuit. Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206
(11th Cir. 1981) (en banc).
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The Effect of a Finding of Unitary Status
on the School Board
The most fundamental result of a finding of unitary status is that supervi-
sion and control of the schools is returned to the school board. The return
of administrative power to the school board has two interrelated effects. First,
the school board may consider such factors as housing patterns, demographic
changes, and "white flight" in making decisions as to how to best run the
schools.' 3 Second, the school board may take action with resegregative ef-
fects without the presumption that such effects are the result of prior un-
constitutional school board action. 44 The school board is limited only by prior
court orders that have not been vacated despite a finding of unitary status'
and by its duty not to take any action that would reinstitute a dual school
system or discriminate against any child on the basis of race. In short, after
a finding of unitary status, the school board generally operates as if there
had never been unconstitutional racial discrimination in the school system.
Prior to a finding of unitary status, the school board is under a continual
duty to eliminate all vestiges of racial discrimination from the schools. Dur-
ing such time, the school board may not justify its failure to establish a unitary
system by demographic changes or "white flight. ' "' 6 Racial disparities that
exist prior to a finding of unitary status are presumed to be causally related
to the school board's prior unconstitutional discrimination.' 4 7 If demographic
changes render a desegregation plan unworkable, the court must adopt another
solution. The school board's duty is to dismantle the dual system, and this
duty "includes the responsibility to adjust for demographic patterns and
changes that predate the advent of a unitary system."' 4'
Once the schcol system is unitary, however, the school board may consider
demographic changes in running its schools. As the Fifth Circuit has
recognized, "[c]hanges in neighborhood ethnicity taking place after school
officials have transformed the system into a unitary one need not be remedied,
. ..for school officials are under no duty to adjust for the purely private
acts of those who choose to vote with their feet." 49 Thus, for example, ethnic
residential preferences and demographic changes for which school officials
bear no responsibility may be considered in determining whether further
143. See generally supra notes 60 & 91 and accompanying text.
144. See generally supra note 93 and accompanying text.
145. Dowell v. Board of Educ., 795 F.2d 1516 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 420 (1986).
See supra note 138 and accompanying text. The Dowell case is discussed in detail infra.
146. See, e.g., Valley v. Rapides Parish School Bd., 646 F.2d 925, 937 (5th Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 455 U.S. 939 (1982) (rejecting school board's argument, where school system not yet
unitary, that continued existence of one-race schools was justified by demographic changes).
See also supra notes 61 & 91 and accompanying text.
147. See, e.g., Vaughns v. Board of Educ., 758 F.2d 983, 991 (4th Cir. 1985) (where the school
system has not achieved unitary status, "it is settled law that plaintiffs were entitled to a presumption
that current placement disparities were causally related to prior segregation and that the burden
of proving otherwise rested on the defendants."). See also supra note 93 and accompanying text.
148. Davis v. East Baton Rouge Parish School Bd., 721 F.2d 1425, 1435 (5th Cir. 1983).
149. Id. (citing Pasadena City Bd. of Educ. v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424, 435-37 (1976)).
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desegregation can be achieved.' Similarly, a school board may consider "white
flight" in stabilizing school integration even if the school board's plan has
resegregative effects." '
A finding of unitary status not only expands the factors a school board
may consider in running the school system, it also affects the changes a school
board may make in the school system and the consequences of those changes.
Prior to a finding of unitary status, "official action that has the effect of
perpetuating or reestablishing a dual school system violates the defendant's
duty to desegregate." 5 2 As a result, school board action that has resegregative
effects may be enjoined without a showing that the school board intended
to discriminate. After a finding of unitary status, however, there is no presump-
tion that official action that has a discriminatory or resegregative effect violates
the Constitution. The finding of unitary status severs the causal relationship
that otherwise may have existed between the resegregative effects and the school
board's prior unlawful conduct. Thus, the school board is in the same position
as any state actor where proof of an equal protection violation requires proof
of an intent to discriminate.'
The combined effects of the finding of unitary status have permitted school
officials to make many administrative decisions they could not have made
in the interim between the implementation of a desegregation plan and the
finding of unitary status. 5 " These decisions include opening and closing
schools,' s constructing new schools in particular locations,'5 6 ability group-
ing,- 7 and curtailing busing. 5 8 As long as the school board's plans are im-
partially maintained and administered, the school board is free to implement
them even if they disproportionately impact on one race. A finding of unitary
150. Id. See also Ross v. Houston Indep. School Dist., 699 F.2d 218, 225 (5th Cir. 1983).
"Once a system becomes unitary, school officials need not make adjustments to changing residential
or attendance patterns even if they result in resegregation." Lively, supra note 57, at 65.
151. Riddick v. School Bd., 784 F.2d 521, 540 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 420 (1986).
152. Pitts v. Freeman, 755 F.2d 1423, 1427 (11th Cir. 1985) (emphasis in original). See also
supra note 93 and accompanying text.
153. See, e.g., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976). Similarly,
After a declaration of unitariness, since all vestiges of the violation have by defini-
tion been eradicated, the school board may adopt a neighborhood assignment system
or choice system even if it produces more segregation than under the court's remedial
plan, provided that the board's action is not intentionally discriminatory and therefore
is not a new constitutional violation.
Gewirtz, supra note 68, at 793-94 n.209. The issue.of intent is addressed infra.
154. A finding of unitary status returns to school board officials the responsibility for educa-
tional decisions that can then be made even if they result in resegregative effects, assuming,
of course, the decisions were made without purposeful discriminatory intent.
155. Mapp v. Board of Educ., 630 F. Supp. 876 (E.D. Tenn. 1986). In Mapp the court held
that the school board could establish a magnet school for academics at one high school and
close another high school despite apparent resegregative effects.
156. Lee v. Anniston City School Sys., 737 F.2d 952 (1lth Cir. 1984).
157. Castaneda v. Pickard, 781 F.2d 456 (5th Cir. 1986).
158. Riddick v. School Bd., 784 F.2d 521 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 420 (1986). But
see Dowell v. Board of Educ., 795 F.2d 1516 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 420 (1986).
These cases are discussed infra.
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1987
OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW
status returns to the school board the plenary power to run the schools free
from any stigma from its earlier unconstitutional conduct.
The Effect of a Finding of Unitary Status on Plaintiffs
Seeking to Challenge Subsequent School Board Action
The effect of a finding of unitary status on plaintiffs seeking to challenge
school board action mirrors the effect on the school board. As noted above,
after a finding of unitary status there is no longer a presumption that school
board actions that have resegregative effects are the result of constitutional
violations embodied in the formerly dual school system. Accordingly, the
school board is free to take administrative action that may result in
discriminatory or resegregative effects subject only to the constraint common
to all state actors not to intentionally discriminate on the basis of race.
The Supreme Court held in Washington v. Davis that to establish a prima
facie case of discrimination under the fourteenth amendment the plaintiff must
produce evidence that the •defendant's actions resulted from discriminatory
purposes." 9 Thus, plaintiffs seeking to enjoin a school board action after a
finding of unitary status cannot rely solely on segregative effects to establish
a cause of action; they must prove that the school board acted with
discriminatory intent.'6 ° Further, the presence of discriminatory intent may
not be inferred solely from the disproportionate impact of a particular school
board action on one race.' 6' In short, it is the intent to discriminate that marks
the difference between permissible de facto segregation and unconstitutional
de jure segregation.' 62
. The lower courts are in agreement that the burden shifts to the plaintiffs
to establish discriminatory intent once a de jure segregated school system has
been found to be unitary. For example, in Riddick the school board adopted
a new student assignment plan eight years after the Norfolk school system
had been declared unitary. The plaintiffs challenged the plan, arguing that
it had resegregative effects and that the school board had the burden of show-
ing that the resegregative effects were not related to earlier constitutional viola-
tions. The Fourth Circuit disagreed, stating that after a finding of unitary
159. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
160. See, e.g., Riddick v. School Bd., 784 F.2d at 538. See also infra note 163. In other words,
prior to a finding of unitary status the school board bears the burden of proving that any of
its actions that reintroduce segregation are consistent with its duty to dismantle the dual school
system. See supra notes 90-94 and accompanying text. After the finding of unitary status, however,
the burden shifts to the plaintiffs challenging the school board action to prove that the school
board acted with discriminatory intent. See generally Note, 100 HARv. L. REv., supra note 57,
discussing allocation of the burden of proof after a finding of unitary status. The Supreme Court
,has not specifically addressed the issue of the shifting burden of proof after a finding of unitary
status. See generally id.
161. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976). The Court stated that standing alone,
disproportionate impact "does not trigger the rule ... that racial classifications are to be sub-
jected to the strictest scrutiny and are justifiable only by the weightiest of considerations." Id.
(citation omitted).
162. Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189 (1973). See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
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status "a plaintiff must prove that the school board acted with an intent to
discriminate in adopting a new student assignment plan." 63 The court added
that it rejected "plaintiffs' argument that the Norfolk school board must con-
tinue to justify all of its actions because of the history of segregation."' 64
The only factor that may relieve the plaintiff of this burden is the existence
of outstanding court orders constraining school board actions.'
The effect of a finding of unitary status on plaintiffs' burden in challeng-
ing school board action is not insignificant. Allocation of the burden of proof
is often dispositive of the merits of a claim. Since discriminatory impact alone
is not sufficient to establish discriminatory intent, 16 6 the plaintiffs must pre-
sent other evidence to establish that the school board had a discriminatory
purpose in adopting a particular plan. This is not always easy. Statistics alone
will rarely suffice, 167 and expert testimony must be balanced against the
testimony of the school board's experts. Further, despite the burden on the
plaintiffs, the school board may proffer reasons as to why it adopted the
plan; if the court finds that the reasons have a factual basis and are reason-
able, it may be nearly impossible for the plaintiffs to prevail. In Riddick,
163. Riddick v. School Bd., 784 F.2d 521, 538 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 420 (1986)
("We hold that the burden of proving discriminatory intent attaches to a plaintiff once a de
jure segregated school system has been found to be unitary."). Accord Pitts v. Freeman, 755
F.2d 1423 (11th Cir. 1985) (because school system not yet unitary, district court erred in holding
that planned expansion of high school could be enjoined only if it was motivated by discriminatory
intent). But see Vaughns v. Board of Educ., 758 F.2d 983, 992-93 (4th Cir. 1985) (requiring
plaintiff to prove intentional discrimination with regard to changes in busing even though system
not unitary). See also infra note 171.
164. Riddick v. School Bd., 784 F.2d at 539.
165. Dowell v. Board of Educ., 795 F.2d 1516 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 420 (1986).
This issue is discussed infra.
One commentator has recently argued that plaintiffs challenging school board actions taken
after a finding of unitary status should not automatically have to prove discriminatory intent
by the school board. Note, 100 HA~v. L. REv., supra note 57, at 667-69. The commentator
maintains that "[u]nitariness does not demonstrate that the intent that created the dual system
is gone, that attitudes have altered," and that "[h]inging the allocation of the burden of proof
exclusively on unitariness ... may attribute more substance to a finding of unitariness than
it warrants." Id. at 667. The commentator proposes a rule that would first require the plaintiffs
"to make a prima facie showing that the action will cause a substantial resegregation of the
school system," and that after this showing, "the burden should shift to school authorities to
prove that the action did not result from an intent to discriminate." Id. at 669. Such a rule,
it is suggested, is consistent with the goal of preventing the reestablishment of a dual school system.
This proposal has merit. However, the same end could be accomplished by having courts
recognize unitary status more cautiously, and by maintaining selected court orders in effect for
a short period after the finding of unitary status. See infra "Returning Control Over School
Board Decisions to the School Board." In any case, at some point the school board should
be deemed to be free from any stigma from its prior unconstitutional conduct. There should
not be a lingering presumption of wrongdoing ad infinitum.
166. A discriminatory impact is, however, relevant to the determination of intent. See, e.g.,
Riddick v. School Bd., 784 F.2d 521, 543 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 420 (1986) (citing
Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449, 464 (1979) and Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman,
443 U.S. 526, 536 n.9 (1979) (Dayton 12)).
167. See, e.g., R. ROTUNDA, J. Now4A & J. YouNo, supra note 20, at 413-14.
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for example, the court found that the plaintiffs failed to sustain the burden
of proving discriminatory intent in part because the school board was able
to justify its reassignment plan by its overall benefits to the school system,
notwithstanding certain resegregative effects. 68
There is some question whether a finding of partial unitary status 69 is suf-
ficient to shift the burden of proving discriminatory intent to plaintiffs challeng-
ing school board action taken in one of the unitary components. In Oliver
v. Kalamazoo Board of Education,'70 the court placed the burden of proving
discriminatory intent on plaintiffs challenging a student assignment plan where
the school system had achieved unitary status in student assignments but not
in other respects.' 7' Similarly, in Mapp v. Board of Education the court held
that plaintiffs had the burden of proving discriminatory intent with regard
to school board action opening and closing schools where the school system
was found unitary in all respects but faculty assignments.' 2 These cases ap-
pear to be the exception, although they are consistent with cases such as Ross
v. Houston Zndependent School District.'" In Ross the court held that the
school system achieved unitary status despite a failure to achieve an integrated
student body. If the concept of partial unitary status is a viable one, as Ross
168. 784 F.2d at 543. In Riddick the court stated that:
[Tihe evidence reveals that Norfolk's neighborhood school assignment plan is a
reasonable attempt by the school board to keep as many white students in public
education ar, possible and so achieve a stably integrated school system. It also
represents an attempt to improve the quality of the school system by seeking a
program to gain greater parental involvement. While the effect of the plan in creating
several black schools is disquieting, that fact alone is not sufficient to prove
discriminatory intent.
Id.
While policies that attempt to stem "white flight," like the plan upheld in Riddick, may be
"vulnerable to criticism that they bend to racist sentiments," such policies "may represent one
of the few options for providing to the largest possible number of students in our urban setting
some semblance of a desegregated education." Lively, supra note 57, at 71.
169. That is, a finding of unitary status in only certain components of the school system's
operations. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
170. 640 F.2d 732, 810-11 (6th Cir. 1980).
171. See also Vanghns v. Board of Educ., 758 F.2d 983, 991 (4th Cir. 1985); Bradley v. Baliles,
639 F. Supp. 680, 636-87 (E.D. Va. 1986). In Bradley, the court briefly discussed Oliver, Vaughns,
and the burden of proof where the school system is not unitary in all respects. 639 F. Supp.
at 686-87. The court noted that the Fourth Circuit in Vaughns interpreted Oliver to place the
burden of proof on plaintiffs "only because the school system had achieved unitary status with
regard to student assignments." Id. The court added that the
Fourth Circut therefore appears to have ruled in Vaughns that, so long as a school
district has achieved unitary status in the area of student assignment, the burden
of proving a causal connection between prior segregation and deficiencies that are
alleged to currently exist in a school system lies with those who claim that vestiges
of the prior discrimination remain in the system.
Id.
172. 630 F. Supp. 876, 884 (E.D. Tenn. 1986).
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indicates and as the Supreme Court suggested in Spangler,174 it follows that
courts recognizing partial unitary status may also shift the burden of proving
discriminatory intent to plaintiffs challenging school board action in areas
declared unitary.
The Oliver and Mapp decisions recognize that a finding of unitary status
must precede placing the burden of proving discriminatory intent on the plain-
tiffs. Thus, these decisions are consistent with the general proposition that
after a finding of unitary status the burden of proving discriminatory intent
falls on those claiming that discrimination exists-the real issue is how nar-
row the finding of unitary status may be.' Courts must be cautious, however,
in recognizing partial unitary status because of its potential effect on the court's
remedial powers, the school board's powers, and the plaintiffs' burden of
proving discriminatory intent.
Finally, after a finding of unitary status, plaintiffs challenging school board
action are usually collaterally estopped from relitigating the unitary character
of the school system. Under collateral estoppel, "once an issue is actually
and necessarily determined ... that determination is conclusive in subsequent
suits based on a different cause of action involving a party to the prior litiga-
tion." 76 Further, if the plaintiffs or their privies had a full and fair oppor-
tunity to contest an issue, they cannot relitigate that issue,' 7 7 In Riddick, for
example, the court held that the plaintiffs-a class of black schoolchildren-
were in sufficient privity with the plaintiff schoolchildren who previously
litigated the finding of unitary status to bar the current plaintiffs from
relitigating that same issue.'78 That the class members may have changed
because of the passage of time was not dispositive.1' Thus, if a court finds
that plaintiffs challenging school board action are the same as, or are in privity
with, the plaintiffs who earlier litigated the finding of unitary status, the find-
ing of unitary status may not be challenged in the later lawsuit. This further
underscores the significance of a finding of unitary status on plaintiffs seek-
ing to challenge school board action.
174. Pasadena City Bd. of Educ. v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424 (1976). See supra notes 74-75
and accompanying text.
175. In Bradley v Baliles, 639 F. Supp. 680 (E.D. Va. 1986), the court acknowledged that
there are differing views as to whether a school district must be unitary in all respects, or only
in the area where new discrimination is alleged, to have the burden of proving discriminatory
intent fall on the plaintiffs. The court did not resolve the issue because it found that the school
system was unitary in all respects. This suggests that this issue will arise only in the rare case
where the court is willing to find partial unitary status and the plaintiffs challenge school board
action taken in the area declared unitary. See supra note 171.
176. Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 153-54 (1979).
177. See, e.g., Riddick v. School Bd., 784 F.2d 521, 532 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct.
420 (1986).
178. Id.
179. Id. See also Bell v. Board of Educ., 683 F.2d 963, 966 (6th Cir. 1982) (prior decision
concerning school board's boundary line changes precluded relitigation of issue fourteen years
later even though class members had changed).
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1987
OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW
The Decision to End Busing After a Finding of Unitary Status:
Riddick v. School Board and Dowell v. Board of Education
The combined effects of a finding of unitary status on the court, the school
board, and the plaintiffs challenging school board action converge on the issue
of a school board's power to end busing after a finding of unitary status.
This issue also magnifies the significance of these effects because of the polariz-
ing and political nature of the school busing issue.' 0 But the issue of ending
busing is not: analytically different from the issue of the school board's power
to take other administrative action after a finding of unitary status. The court,
the school board, and the plaintiffs challenging school board action are sub-
ject to the same constraints whether the school board seeks to open and close
schools, alter attendance zones, or end busing.
The Riddick and Dowell courts addressed for the first time whether the
school board has the power to end busing after a finding of unitary status.
In both cases the school board had adopted a student reassignment plan that
in part curtailed busing. The Fourth Circuit upheld the plan in Riddick, and
the Norfolk school system became the first school system in the country to
end court-ordered busing.' In Dowell, on the other hand, the Tenth Circuit
struck down the plan. Not surprisingly, these cases have been perceived as
being inconsistent because of the opposite effects the cases had on busing
in each of the school systems."02 This perception, however, is largely misplaced.
The point on which the cases disagree is whether a finding of unitary status
automatically dissolves previous court orders mandating desegregation. Dowell
expressly held that it does not; Riddick implied that it does, though Riddick
did not expressly address the issue. Dowell implied, however, that had the
order finding unitary status also expressly dissolved earlier court orders, the
school board's plan to curtail busing might have been permissible absent a
showing of discriminatory intent. Thus, these cases are as important for their
similarities as for their differences.
In Riddick the school board adopted a student reassignment plan curtailing
busing twelve years after a court order implemented mandatory cross-town
busing and eight years after the school system had been declared unitary." 3
The plan was challenged by black schoolchildren who alleged that the plan
violated the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. The district
court upheld the plan. On appeal to the Fourth Circuit, four issues were raised:
180. See, e.g., supra note 58 and accompanying text.
181. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
182. See, e.g., Washington Post, Nov. 4, 1986, at Al, col. 4. See also United States v. Lawrence
County School Dist., 799 F.2d 1031, 1038 (5th Cir. 1986) (court stated that it "need not address
the conflict in the views of the Fourth and Tenth Circuits concerning the burden of proof that
must be borne by plaintiffs who 'seek changes in the administration of a school system after
the system has been declared unitary in the sense of being fully integrated"). See infra note 195.
183. 784 F.2d at 524-25. The litigation to end segregated schools in Norfolk began in 1956.
In 1971 the ccurt adopted a desegregation plan that included mandatory busing. In 1975 the
school system was declared unitary, and in 1983 the school board adopted the reassignment plan
curtailing busing. See supra notes 102-109 and accompanying text.
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(1) whether the 1975 court order declaring the Norfolk school system unitary
was applicable to this lawsuit; (2) whether the school system had remained
unitary; (3) whether, because of the finding of unitary status, the plaintiffs
had the burden of proving that the school board acted with discriminatory
intent in adopting the reassignment plan; and (4) whether the school board
was motivated by discriminatory intent in adopting the reassignment plan. 8,
With regard to the first two issues, the court held that the doctrine of col-
lateral estoppel precluded relitigation of the 1975 finding of unitary status'85
and that the school system had remained unitary." 6 As to the third and fourth
issues, the court held that the finding of unitary status required the plaintiffs
to prove discriminatory intent on the part of the school board, 87 which the
plaintiffs failed to do. '88 The court limited its holding, however, by stating
that its decision was "a limited one, applicable only to those school systems
which have succeeded in eradicating all vestiges of de jure segregation. In
those systems, the school boards and not the federal courts will run the schools,
absent a showing of an intent to discriminate."'
89
There is little remarkable about the court's analysis in Riddick. The school
board succeeded in ending school busing simply because the court found that
the school board had eliminated all effects of its prior unlawful discrimina-
tion. As a result the school board could run the school system as it saw fit.
Because the school board believed that further busing would exacerbate "white
flight" and destabilize the school integration that had been achieved, the school
board was within its powers to curtail busing, provided its real purpose was
not to discriminate on the basis of race. In short, the court recognized that
the court, the school board, and the plaintiffs all operated under a new set
of assumptions after the finding of unitary status.
In Dowell, as in Riddick, the school board adopted an attendance plan
that included curtailing compulsory busing of certain students. The plan was
adopted thirteen years after the court ordered mandatory busing and eight
years after the school system had been declared unitary. 19 The district court
held that the plan was constitutional even though it increased the number
184. 784 F.2d at 529.
185. Id. at 529-34. See supra notes 178-179 and accompanying text.
186. It is not clear why the court addressed the second issue, as it appears to add nothing
to the analysis. The court found that the school system achieved unitary status in 1975. Thus,
whether the student assignment plan discriminated against the plaintiffs is really the same issue
as whether the school system remained unitary. In either case, the court recognized that the
finding of unitary status shifts the burden of proving discriminatory intent to the plaintiffs if
school board action is challenged as having resegregative effects.
187. 784 F.2d at 534-39. See supra note 163 and accompanying text.
188. 784 F.2d at 539-43.
189. Id. at 543.
190. Dowell v. Board of Educ., 795 F.2d 1516, 1517-18 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct.
420 (1986). The Dowell case began in 1961. In 1972 the court ordered the implementation of
a busing plan. In 1977 the school system was declared unitary, and the school board plan that
curtailed busing was adopted in 1985. See supra notes 110-111 and accompanying text.
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of racially identifiable schools. 19' On appeal, the Tenth Circuit reversed. The
court did not, however, follow the Fourth Circuit's analysis in Riddick. In-
stead, the court only addressed whether the 1972 desegregation order man-
dating busing was still binding on the school board despite the subsequent
finding of unitary status.
The Tenth Circuit stated that the 1972 order implementing busing was a
mandatory injunction that had a life, like any injunction may have, beyond
the procedural life of the litigation. 92 The court concluded that the injunc-
tion was binding on the parties until it was either modified or dissolved. The
court specifically found that the 1977 order finding unitary status did not
dissolve the injunction.'93 According to the Tenth Circuit, "without specifically
dissolving its decree, the court neither abrogated its power to enforce the man-
datory order nor forgave the defendants their duty to persist in the elimina-
tion of the vestiges of discrimination."
94
Thus, in order for the plaintiffs to enjoin the new attendance plan they
were required only to prove that the mandatory injunction had been violated,
not that the school board's action violated the Constitution.'9 The "historical
finding" of unitary status did not "preclude the plaintiffs from asserting that
a continuing mandatory order" was not being obeyed.' 9 , Therefore, the court
reversed the district court and remanded the case for a determination as to
whether the 1972 order should be enforced or modified.
The Tenth Circuit expressly recognized that the Fourth Circuit had "taken
a different view" in Riddick.'" However, the court reasoned that even though
the finding of unitary status restored unsupervised governance to the school
board, "the board must, like any other litigant, return to the court if it wants
to alter the duties imposed upon it by a mandatory decree."'  The court
191. Dowell v. Board of Educ., 606 F. Supp. 1548 (W.D. Okla. 1985), rev'd, 795 F.2d 1516
(10th Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 420 (1986). The district court's analysis was almost identical
to the Fourth Circuit's analysis in Riddick.
192. Doweil v. Board of Educ., 795 F.2d at 1521.
193. Id. at 1519 ("Nothing in the 1977 oider tempered the 1972 mandatory injunction.").
The Dowell decisicn should not be read to imply that had plaintiffs attempted to dissolve the
court orders at the time of the 1977 order, the court would have had to dissolve the orders.
In other words, it is not necessarily inconsistent for certain court orders to continue in effect
after the finding cf unitary status. See infra note 203 and accompanying text.
194. 795 F.2d at 1520.
195. Id. at 1523 In a recent Fifth Circuit case the court stated that the Riddick and Dowell
decisions indicated a conflict over the burden of proof that must be borne by plaintiffs who
seek changes in th! operation of a school system after the system has been declared unitary.
United States v. Lawrence County School Dist., 799 F.2d 1031, 1038 (5th Cir. 1986). See supra
note 182. This is misleading. The conflict is over the effect of the finding of unitary status on
previous court-orders. The difference in the burden of proof is simply the logical result of the
difference in the treatment of this effect of a finding of unitary status.
The Riddick and Dowell cases are also briefly discussed in Note, 100 Hatv. L. REv., supra
note 57, at 653-43 n.5. This commentator recognized that the courts differed over whether the
finding of unitary status automatically terminates previous court orders.
196. 795 F.2d at 1522.
197. Id. at 1520 n.3.
198. Id. at 1520. See supra note 193 and accompanying text.
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added that termination of active supervision of a case does not prevent the
court from enforcing its orders; it "is only where the order terminating active
supervision also dissolves the mandatory injunction that the governing board
regains total independence from the previous injunction." 99 The court noted
that in Riddick the Fourth Circuit seemed "to treat a district court order ter-
minating supervision as an order digsolving a mandated integration plan,
despite the absence of a specific order to that effect. ' 2 ° The Dowell court
refused to adopt that view, however, declaring that in Riddick the "court
makes a bridge between a finding of unitariness and voluntary compliance
with an injunction .... A finding of unitariness may lead to many other
reasonable conclusions, but it cannot . . . convert a mandatory injunction
into voluntary compliance." 10 1
The Tenth Circuit's characterization of the Riddick decision appears cor-
rect, although the court in Riddick never addressed the merits of the issue
addressed in Dowell. The court in Riddick simply stated that after the 1975
finding of unitary status the school system was "no longer under court order"
to continue busing. 202 The court implicitly concluded, for whatever reason,
that the 1971 order mandating busing did not survive the 1975 order finding
unitary status, despite the absence of a clear signal from either order that
an order finding unitary status supersedes earlier desegregation orders. It may
be that the court believed that the 1971 order was originally intended to last
only until the finding of unitary status. It may also be, as the court in Dowell
suggested, that the court believed the 1975 order automatically terminated
the busing order. In any event, the Riddick court did not necessarily imply
that a school board did not have to obey previous court orders after a finding
of unitary status; it only implied that in the case before it there were no longer
any court orders for the school board to obey.
Regardless of how the Riddick court reached its conclusion that the school
board was not bound by prior desegregation orders, it is clear that the Rid-
dick and Dowell courts do disagree over whether a finding of unitary status
may impliedly affect earlier desegregation orders. In other words, the real
conflict is over how clear the signal must be that a later court order supersedes
an earlier one. The Tenth Circuit's view is that absent a clear statement in
a later order dissolving or modifying an earlier order, the earlier order re-
mains in full force and effect. 20 3 The Fourth Circuit takes the opposite view-
199. 795 F.2d at 1520-21. See generally Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 653 F. Supp. 1536, 1541-42
(D. Colo. 1987) (citing Dowell).
200. 795 F.2d at 1520 n.3.
201. Id.
202. Riddick v. School Bd., 784 F.2d 521, 525 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 420 (1986).
203. In fact, in Dowell the court order finding unitary status strongly implied that the school
board remained bound by the earlier desegregation orders. Dowell, 795 F.2d at 1519. Thus, Dowell
is not a case where the court order finding unitary status is simply silent as to its effect on
earlier court orders, as is true in Riddick. Moreover, Dowell does not suggest that had the plain-
tiffs attempted to dissolve the court orders at the time of the finding of unitary status, the court
would have had to dissolve the orders. In other words, the court does not seem to attribute
to plaintiffs solely a procedural error. The court orders were designed to maintain a unitary
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that if the order finding unitary status is silent as to its effect on earlier orders,
the earlier orders are superseded. The Fourth Circuit's position may simply
be that it is inconsistent to recognize the unitary status of a school system
and at the same time restrict the school board's operation of its schools. This
position is appealing, but it is not without problems.204 One might argue that
the court's duty to vigilantly ensure that desegregation is finally achieved re-
quires the court to expressly dissolve its earlier orders before allowing the
school board to take action that might otherwise violate them, even if the
school system has achieved unitary status.
20
1
The disagreement over whether a finding of unitary status automatically
dissolves previous court orders does not set the Fourth and Tenth Circuits
completely at odds. Dowell implicitly recognized that an order finding that
unitary status had dissolved earlier desegregation orders would allow the school
board to curtail busing absent proof of a discriminatory intent. Thus, as in
Riddick, the court in Dowell recognized that the finding of unitary status
does affect the court's role in overseeing the school system, the powers of
the school board, and the plaintiff's burden of proof. Dowell merely tempered
the full realization of these changes by its view that the school board was
still bound by earlier court orders that had not been expressly dissolved. In
short, the full implications of Dowell are not necessarily inconsistent with
Riddick. Dowell and Riddick both recognize that at some point full control
of school operations must be returned to the school board; absent a showing
of discriminatory intent, the school board is free to run the schools as it sees fit.
In sum, the Riddick and Dowell decisions, despite their differences, indicate
that school busing need not go on forever, and that at some point it will
be within the school board's power to curtail busing. At such time, Riddick
holds and Dowell implies, the school board may curtail busing absent a showing
of discriminatory intent, just as it may take other administrative action. This
result is clearly consistent with the Supreme Court's admonition in Swann
school system, as well as to achieve one. Id. at 1520. Thus, the finding of unitary status does
not automatically preclude the continued effect of mandatory court orders. The school board
must prove an ind.-pendent need to have the injunction modified or dissolved. Id. at 1523. See
also Note, 100 HAgv. L. REv., supra note 57, at 653-54 n.5.
The proposal set forth infra, involving two levels of hearings to determine whether the school
system has achieved unitary status and whether the case should be dismissed, also entails that
court orders may remain in effect after the finding of unitary status. The continued life of cer-
tain court orders after the finding of unitary status is not necessarily inconsistent with the con-
cept of unitary status. The court may determine that the school system is unitary but that, given
the history of the case, continued judicial supervision is warranted to ensure that unitary status
has the best chance of being maintained after the court finally relinquishes its jurisdiction. Thus,
the final termination of the court's jurisdiction, not the finding of unitary status, may be the
point at which all court orders will be terminated and the school board will be entirely free
to run the school system as it deems best. See infra notes 211 & 213 and accompanying text.
204. See supra note 203 and infra notes 211 & 213 and accompanying text.
205. See supra note 203 and infra notes 211 & 213 and accompanying text. Under the pro-
posal set forth below, existing court orders, if not terminated when the court finds that the
school system has achieved unitary status, will terminate when the court relinquishes its jurisdic-
tion and dismisses the case.
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that there are limits beyond which a court may not go in seeking to dismantle
a dual school system. 20 6 The limits are largely demarcated by the finding of
unitary status.
Returning Control Over School Board Decisions
to the School Board: A Proposal
The disagreement between the Fourth and Tenth circuits in Riddick and
Dowell in regard to how a finding of unitary status affects earlier desegrega-
tion orders suggests the need for a common procedure for courts to follow
in relinquishing control over school board decisions. Such a procedure should
conclusively determine the nature and duration of a school board's obliga-
tions after a finding of unitary status. Courts should not have to guess whether
the order finding unitary status was intended to supersede, sub silentio, previous
court orders or whether it was merely a declaration of a historical fact. Fur-
ther, if previous court orders do remain in effect, both the school board and
the court should clearly understand what actions the school board must take
to be free of federal court control. Finally, such a procedure should ensure
that the school board would eventually fulfill its duty to eradicate all vestiges
of past discrimination and that federal court supervision of public schools
would not needlessly go on forever.
The procedure to end federal court oversight of public school systems should
involve two levels of hearings to determine whether the school system achieved
full unitary status and whether the case should be dismissed. The first-level
hearing should be held upon motion by the school board after a desegrega-
tion plan has been implemented and in operation for a period of years. The
hearing should be preceded by notice to the plaintiffs, who will have the op-
portunity at the hearing to show that the school system still retains vestiges
of its past dual character. The court should closely scrutinize the school board's
progress in desegregating its schools, and the burden of proof should be on
the school board to establish that it has in fact eliminated all effects of its
prior unlawful conduct.
At the first-level hearing the court should specifically address several points
and make specific findings of fact as to each. First, if the court finds that
the school system has not achieved unitary status the court should: (1)
specifically describe those components of the school system that remain dual;
(2) set forth the steps the school board must take to remedy those areas; (3)
set forth whether previous court orders remain in effect; and (4) set a date
for another first-level hearing to determine whether the school board has suc-
ceeded in achieving unitary status. Second, if the court finds that the school
system has achieved unitary status, the court must: (1) state whether the school
system achieved unitary status in all respects; 20 7 (2) state whether previous
court orders in the same case are modified, dissolved, or remain in full force
206. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 34 (1971).
207. Courts should be reluctant to recognize partial unitary status, so as to avoid piecemeal
adjudication of the status of various components of the school system. In addition, the Supreme
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and effect; and (3) if the court found that the school system achieved only
partial unitary status or that previous court orders are to remain in effect,
state the school board's future obligations in those areas that remain dual
or under previous court orders. This way there cannot be any confusion over
the school board's powers and the continued scope of the court's remedial
authority.
If the court finds that the school system has achieved only partial unitary
status, the court should set a date for another first-level hearing to determine
whether the school system has achieved full unitary status. At this subsequent
hearing, if the court finds that this condition has still not been met, the court
should restate the school board's obligations and set a date for another first-
level hearing. This procedure should be repeated until the court finds that
the school system has become fully unitary.
0 8
Once the court finds that the school system has achieved full unitary status,
the court should follow procedures similar to those adopted by the Fifth Cir-
cuit in Youngblood.209 That is, the court should state that it is retaining jurisdic-
tion over the case for a given period of time before finally dismissing the
action.2"' While jurisdiction is retained, periodic reports should be filed with
the court indicating the continued racial balance in all components of the
school system. Further, during this period the court may enforce any previous
court orders that remain in force to ensure the maintenance of the unitary
system.21 A.t the end of this period, the second-level hearing will be held.
Court has made it clear that all vestiges of the segregated school system must be eradicated.
See infra note 208 and accompanying text. See generally supra note 175 and accompanying text.
208. See, e.g., Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 15 (1971). But
see supra note 125 and accompanying text.
209. Youngblood v. Board of Pub. Instr., 448 F.2d 770 (5th Cir. 1971) (per curiam). See
supra notes 139-141 and accompanying text.
210. In Youngblood the time period was three years. The length of this period should depend
upon a number of factors, including the severity of the initial constitutional violation(s), the
degree of initial and continuing school board recalcitrance to implement desegregation remedies,
the overall level of good faith exhibited by the school board, and the complexity of the case.
The court should be flexible in adopting this time period and should adopt a period based on
the particular facts of the case. See also infra note 216.
211. Thus, as in Dowell, the finding of unitary status does not necessarily preclude the con-
tinued existence of court orders affecting school board operations. The court may determine
that certain court orders should continue beyond the finding of unitary status to ensure that
unitary status i; maintained by the remedial procedures that have proven effective. This does
not imply, however, that the court orders should last forever and the school board, despite the
finding of unitary status, may never regain full control over the school system. The court orders
that continue in effect beyond the finding of unitary status will terminate when the court decides
to terminate its jurisdiction and close the case. See supra note 203 and accompanying text.
In some cases, it will be the termination of the court's jurisdiction and the dismissal of the
case, along with the finding of unitary status, that fully restores control to the school board
and, for example, marks the point at which resegregation may lawfully begin. See supra notes
57 & 134. Although this two-step procedure may diminish the full effect of the finding of unitary
status in those cases where the school system will remain subject to certain court orders, this
effect will be short term and is justified by the need to ensure that the court was not too hasty
in recognizing unitary status. See infra note 216 and accompanying text. In these cases the second-
level hearing is, in effect, a check on the earlier finding of unitary status.
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This hearing gives the court a final opportunity to determine whether the school
system has remained fully unitary and provides the plaintiffs a final oppor-
tunity to show why court oversight should continue.212 Again, the powers and
obligations of the school board and the scope of the court's remedial powers
during this period should be clearly set out in the order finding unitary status.
If, at the second-level hearing, the court concludes that the school system
has remained fully unitary and judicial oversight is no longer necessary, the
court should dismiss the case, terminate all outstanding court orders, 13 and
close the docket. If the court finds, however, that the school system should
remain under the court's oversight for an additional period of time, even
though it is fully unitary, the court should not dismiss the case but should
reschedule another second-level hearing at a later date. The court should also
restate the continuing obligations of the school board, including reporting
requirements. Eventually, the court will find that the school system has re-
mained fully unitary and that federal court oversight is no longer necessary.
The court should then dismiss the case and state that the school board is
no longer bound by any court orders previously issued in the case, i.e., all
previous court orders should be expressly dissolved.
The order dismissing the case will mark the point where federal court in-
volvement in the school system is finally and completely over. After the final
order, the school board will run the schools free from all court supervision.
Plaintiffs seeking to challenge subsequent school board action will have to
file a new lawsuit.
1 4
This procedure is similar to the procedure some courts already appear to
be following. In the Fifth Circuit, for example, where the Youngblood pro-
cedure was adopted, the courts are required to have two separate hearings-
212. Of course, resegregative changes taken subsequent to the finding of unitary status cannot
be remedied absent either proof of a new constitutional violation or proof that an existing court
order has been violated. See, e.g., supra note 160 and accompanying text. Thus, during the
time period between the finding of unitary status and the final dismissal of the case, the court
should be primarily concerned with monitoring compliance with existing court orders with a
view toward their ultimate termination.
213. If the court order finding unitary status also terminates all existing court orders, the
finding of unitary status will mark the time at which full control of the school system returns
to the school board. If, however, the finding of unitary status does not also terminate all existing
court orders, the court orders that continue to constrain the school board must be terminated
at some point before the court relinquishes jurisdiction and terminates the case. If the school
system indeed achieved unitary status, the school board must eventually be permitted to freely
run the school system subject only to its obligation not to discriminate anew.
The continued existence of court orders that survive the finding of unitary status is not incon-
sistent with the finding of unitary status if the court orders ensure the maintenance of the unitary
system for a limited period of time and, in effect, operate as a check on the initial decision
to recognize unitary status. It would, however, be inconsistent with the school board's fulfillment
of its constitutional obligations to have the court control school board decisions ad infinitum.
See supra note 211 and accompanying text.
214. After the case has been dismissed in the second-level hearing, plaintiffs should not be
permitted to reopen the case under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b), absent extraordinary
circumstances. This would help ensure that federal court involvement in the school system would
in fact finally conclude when the case was dismissed. Compare supra note 131.
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one to determine if the school system is unitary and one to determine if the
case should be dismissed. However, there does not appear to have been a
universal adoption of this procedure even within the Fifth Circuit. 21" Further,
this procedure does not require the courts to specifically apprise the parties
of their continuing obligations. Because the confusion between Riddick and
Dowell results from a failure of communication, it is crucial that the courts
adopt a procedure to relinquish control over school systems that keeps all
parties to the litigation, and the court, fully informed of the school board's
continuing responsibilities.
The finding of unitary status remains the focus of the desegregation ef-
forts. It is the beginning of the end of federal court oversight of the school
system. It cannot be the end itself, however, because the court must have
additional time to ensure that it was not too hasty in finding that the school
board has completely fulfilled its constitutional duties. Further, those who
struggled to achieve unitary status deserve as much assurance as reasonably
possible that their efforts will not have been wasted. Thus, the two-step pro-
posal strikes the proper balance between the primary goal of ensuring that
the school system has in fact become unitary and the secondary goal of en-
suring that federal court oversight of the school system does not needlessly
go on forever.21 6
Conclusion
Until the last half of this century, the opportunity for millions of minority
schoolchildren to obtain a meaningful education was precluded by law. After
1954 the federal courts vigorously pursued the promise of Brown I to ensure
that race would no longer be a barrier to equal educational opportunities.
But racial prejudices die slowly, if at all. As a result of the widespread oppo-
sition to Brown I, the federal courts were often forced to take over the school
boards' role in running school systems. When the school boards failed in their
constitutional duties to convert the dual school systems to unitary ones, the
federal courts stepped in to enforce Brown Ps constitutional mandate.
In many cases, federal court supervision of school systems has lasted more
than twenty-five years. In cases such as Riddick and Dowell, the courts have
215. See supra note 142 and accompanying text.
216. After decades of litigation, it is not difficult to understand that a district court might
not want to monitor a school system any longer than is absolutely necessary. See, e.g., Mapp
v. Board of Educ., 648 F. Supp. 992 (E.D. Tenn. 1986) (court declined to retain jurisdiction
and monitor schcol system after finding the last aspect of the school system to be unitary),
discussed supra at notes 131 & 135.
The length of the period between the finding of unitary status and dismissal should be based
on the particular facts of the case. See supra note 210. The court should not lightly determine
that no further monitoring is necessary because too much is at stake. The decision in Mapp
to dismiss the case may have rested largely on the fact that the court had earlier found unitary
status in all aspects but one, which in effect gave the court time to monitor the school system's
ongoing compliance until the last component of the system was found to be unitary. Mapp v.
Board of Educ., 630 F. Supp. 876 (E.D. Tenn. 1986).
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implemented desegregation plans with the goal that at some point the school
system will achieve unitary status and all vestiges of the school board's prior
unconstitutional conduct will be eliminated. As part of such desegregation
plans, the courts often ordered that schoolchildren be bused to previously
racially segregated schools. The end of court-ordered busing was a political
battle cry of the 1970s. It became a reality in Norfolk in 1986.
The end to mandatory busing is part of the broader issue of ending federal
court supervision of school systems. The threshold point in ending federal
court oversight is the finding that the school system has acheived unitary status.
Once the school system achieves unitary status, the school board regains super-
vision of the school system and the federal courts' remedial powers are corre-
spondingly reduced. One action the school board may then take is to end
busing. Whether the school board will be successful will depend in part on
whether previous court orders mandating busing were expressly dissolved or,
if not, whether the finding of unitary status automatically dissolved them.
The next phase of litigation in the school desegregation cases will address
these issues as more and more school systems achieve unitary status and at-
tempt to end busing. The Dowell and Riddick cases represent the beginning
of this phase.
As an increasing number of courts address the effects of the finding of
unitary status and the propriety of school board decisions ending busing, the
courts must be cautious to ensure that the promise of Brown I is not thwarted
in the final hour. A procedure, such as the one proposed in this article, should
be adopted to ensure that the school boards fulfill their duty to eradicate
all vestiges of past discrimination. The courts' primary concern should not
be whether federal court oversight, or even busing, will go on forever but
whether desegregation has been once and for all achieved. Federal court over-
sight of school systems and busing should eventually end; but it is the goal
of equality, not of administrative convenience, that fulfills the promise of
Brown 1.217
217. In April of 1987, the promise of Brown I was finally fulfilled in the Topeka, Kansas,
public school system. The Topeka school system was one of five parties to Brown v. Board
of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (Brown 1). Thirty-three years after the landmark decision in Brown
I, United States District Judge Richard D. Rogers declared that the Topeka school system has
achieved unitary status. See Knudsen, Judge Rules Kan. Schools are "Unitary," NAT'L L.J.,
Apr. 27, 1987, at 7, col. I.
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